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Tiivistelmä
Taktisen allokaation ja markkinoiden ajoittamisen tutkimukssa tutkijat ovat
löytäneet laajalti erillaisia osakemarkkinoita ennustavia tekijöitä; arvostustasojen,
yrityksen fundamenttien, makrotalouden muuttujien, sentimentti-indikaattoreiden ja
kausivaihteluiden on havaittu ennustavan osakkeiden riskipreemiota. Vaikuttaa
kuitenkin siltä, että suuri osa aikaisemmin julkaistuista löydöksistä on saatu
tiedonlouhinnalla. Erityisesti useita tilastollisia testejä on tehty huomioimatta
merkitsevyystason asianmukaisesta korjaamista. Useissa tutkimuksissa testit on
lisäksi tehty samalla ajanjaksolla, jota käytettiin alkuperäisen mallin sovittamiseen.
Diplomityö arvioi uudelleen aikaisemmat taktisen allokaation ja markkinoiden
ajoittamisen tutkimuksessa esitetyt löydökset osakemarkkinoiden ennustamisesta.
Otoksen ulkopuolella tehdyt testit osoittavat, ettei osakeriskipreemioita ole ollut
mahdollista ennustaa reaaliajassa vuosituhannen vaihteen jälkeen. Diplomityö siten
suosittelee passiivista osta ja pidä –strategiaa sekä yksityisille että ammattimaisille
sijoittajille. Mikäli sijoittajat kuitenkin haluavat yrittää taktista allokaatioita,
potentiaalisimpia seurattavia markkinasignaaleita näyttävät olevan inflaatio ja
ETF-pääomavirrat.
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7Symbols and abbreviations
A Assets
a Aggregate wealth
ACF Autocorrelation function
AUM Assets under management
B Book value
BDI Baltic Dry Index
BUS Business
C Private consumption, currency
c Aggregate consumption
CAPE Cyclically-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio,
CAY Consumption to wealth ratio
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CBOE The Chicago Board Options Exchange
CPI Consumer price index
Cr Credit
CS Credit spread
D Dividend
DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average
DJTA Dow Jones Transportation Average
D/P Dividend yield
E Earnings
EA Euro area
ECB European Central Bank
E/P Earnings yield
EPS Earnings per share
ERP Equity risk premium
ETF Exchange traded fund
FDR False discovery rate
FED Federal Reserve
FF Fund flow
FOMO Fear of missing out
FRED Federal Reserve Economic Data
FWER Family-wise error rate
FX Forex, foreign exchange
8G Government spending and investment
g Perpetual growth rate
GDP Gross domestic product
GOV Government
H Hypothesis
HH Household
I Gross investment
i Nominal interet rate
IMF International monetary fund
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate
M Momentum, imports, money supply
m Money multiplier, number of performed tests
MB Monetary base
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International
n Sample size
NPO Non-profit organization
NPV Net present value
NXR Nominal exchange rate
OLS Ordinary leased squares
OMO Open market operations
P Price, probability
p Probability value
PACF Partial autocorrelation function
P/B Price-to-book ratio
PCR Put–call ratio
P/E Price-to-earnings
PEAD Post-earnings-announcement drift
QE Quantitative easing
R Return
R2 Coefficient of determination
r Real interest rate
RPR Rolling percentile rank
SAA Strategic asset allocation
SDW ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
SMA Simple moving average
S&P Standard & Poor’s
9SR Sharpe ratio
SRA Sale and repurchase agreement
SUE Standardized unexpected earnings
TAA Tactical asset allocation
US United States
VIX Volatility Index
X Exports
Y Bond yield
y Aggregate income
YC Yield curve
YTM Yield to maturity
α Significance level, type I error rate
β Regression coefficient, type II error rate
µ Mean
π Inflation
σ Standard deviation
σ2 Variance
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1 Introduction
1.1 Asset allocation
Diversification is an essential principle of investment management. The modern
portfolio theory suggests that investors obtain better risk-return trade-off by
holding a broadly diversified portfolio rather than just a few investments (Markowitz,
1952). Diversification is based on the notion that adding more investments reduces
the exposure to individual asset risk, and thereby decreases the overall risk in the
portfolio. However, not all investments are equal in terms of diversification benefits.
Investments within the same asset class, have, by definition, similar characteristics
and are therefore subject to several same value drivers and risks. Thus, diversifying
just within one asset class results in an inefficient portfolio, which does not offer the
optimal return relative to the born risk. Therefore, investors need to diversify also
across asset classes. (Sharpe, 1992)
Asset allocation determines the asset class weights in an investment portfolio.
Research has shown that asset allocation is as important determinant of portfolio
return as active management (Ibbotson, 2010). Asset allocation is divided into long-
term strategic asset allocation (SAA) and short-term tactical asset allocation
(TAA). SAA represents the mix of assets which is expected to meet investors financial
objectives in the long-term, typically over a one-year horizon. Investors’ overall risk-
return profile, as well as diversification benefits, are the main factors affecting the
strategic allocation decision. TAA, in turn, refers to the practice of actively adjusting
the strategic asset allocation mix. TAA attempts to increase portfolio returns by
over- and under-weighting asset classes according to temporary changes in their
expected returns. Market timing is an extreme form of TAA that involves frequent
shifts into and out of asset classes in an attempt to time the market peaks and
troughs (Evensky et al., 2011). Over time, however, the strategic allocation is the
most important determinant of the total return of a portfolio, while well-implemented
TAA can contribute at the margin (Stockton & Shtekhman, 2010).
1.2 Evaluating systematic TAA strategies
TAA strategies can be either discretionary or systematic. In discretionary TAA
strategies, allocation decisions are made based on the investment manager’s
judgement. In systematic TAA strategies, in turn, allocation decisions are based on
a quantitative forecasting model. A TAA model uses financial and economic
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variables, or signals, to predict short-term asset class returns. Predictive signals are
referred to as bull or bear (trade) signals according to their expected correlation
with future returns.
Practitioners have found some best practices for evaluating systematic TAA
strategies. Most importantly, strategies should be verified through robust empirical
research. A strategy should generate significant excess returns whether it is tested
on in-sample or out-of-sample periods. In-sample period refers to the data that
is used for the initial parameter estimation and to the model selection. Parameters
obtained from in-sample estimation would not have been known to investors in
real-time, i.e., until the end of the sample. Therefore, findings should also be applied
to an out-of-sample period, which refers to a data-set other than the one used for
fitting the model.
However, "correlation does not imply causation" is a necessary disclaimer for
all statistical tests. The phrase refers to a logical fallacy, in which two events
occurring together are immediately considered to have an established cause-and-
effect relationship (see "Super Bowl Indicator and Equity Markets" by (Schmidt
& Clayton, 2017)). Thus, strategy evaluation should begin with disregarding all
signals which conflict with economic intuition. All tested signals should have rational
and logical explanations for their expected predictive power. Investment managers
should also understand the underlying theories related to the signals and be aware
of signals mutual connections. Moreover, investment managers need to be confirmed
that empirical results are not obtained just by "mining the data", which refers, for
example, to rerunning tests with modified signals until the statistically significant
results are obtained.
Finally, systematic TAA strategies, like any other strategy, should be evaluated
in terms of risk-adjusted returns. Strategies, which provide excess returns at the
expense of a disproportionate increase in risk, are not actually value-adding because,
through the use of leverage or leverage-like techniques, investors can always increase
returns at the expense of increased risk. (Stockton & Shtekhman, 2010)
1.3 Research setting
The objective of the thesis is to identify tactical asset allocation signals for US and
European equities. The objective is guided through three research questions:
1. Which signals are the most promising equity market predictors based on
previous financial research and expert interviews?
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2. Are the selected signals able to predict the time series of equity risk premium
both in-sample and out-of-sample?
3. Are the results statistically significant when the effects of multiple testing and
data mining are accounted for?
The first research question aims to review the vast equity market timing and
TAA literature comprehensively. Experienced asset managers and investment
bankers from Helsinki, London and Paris also contribute by sharing their knowledge
and understanding of the topic. Companies, institutions and their representatives,
however, prefer to remain anonymous. Nevertheless, in order to be selected for the
empirical tests, logical reasoning is required to explain the signals’ expected ability
to predict market returns. Signals should also occur frequently because robust
empirical testing requires multiple occurrences. Therefore, "fat tails" and "black
swan" type of extremely rare events are excluded from the thesis.
The second research question makes an important distinction. The thesis
concentrates exclusively on time series predictability in stead of cross-sectional
predictability. Time series predictability refers to variation in the expected return
for a given asset class over time. Cross-sectional predictability, in turn, refers to
variation in the expected returns of various different assets at a given point in time.
The second research question also guarantees that the signals are tested on
out-of-sample periods as well.
Finally, the third research question addresses the severe problem of data mining.
Data mining refers to all statistical processes which misuse sample data with the
intention to enhance reported results. For example, performing multiple tests increases
the likelihood that some variables exceed the predetermined significance level just
by luck. In general, the more inferences are made, the more likely false inferences
occur. Different disciplines use different terminologies for this problem. In physics,
multiple testing is referred to as the "look-elsewhere effect". In medical science, and
particularly in genome association studies, "multiple comparisons" is often used. In
finance, "data mining", "data snooping", "overfitting", "p-hacking", "selection bias"
and "multiple testing" are often used interchangeably.
The thesis is organized as follows. The second section presents the rationales and
theories behind the most potential TAA and market timing signals. The third section
introduces the empirical testing framework, which focuses on mitigating data-mining
and especially the multiple testing problem. The fourth section shows the results,
and also discusses the implications. The fifth section offers the concluding remarks,
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and finally, the sixth section suggests further research areas.
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2 Understanding the TAA signals presented in
the literature
2.1 Market value
2.1.1 Technical analysis
Equity market prediction has long traditions in finance. Already at the end of 19th
century, the founder of The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones indexes, Charles Dow
(1851 – 1902), developed a series of principles for interpreting and analyzing stock
market behaviour. The principles became later known as the Dow theory, which is
commonly regarded as the groundwork of modern technical analysis. As a part
of his principles, Dow presented the oldest market timing strategy that is still used
today. Dow suggested that the market would be bullish when both the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) and the Dow Jones Transportation Average (DJTA) reach
historically high levels. Similarly, the market would be bearish when both indexes
fall to historically low levels. If one would not follow the other, the movement was
not likely the beginning of a new sustainable trend. (Schannep, 2008)
Dow assumed that in healthy business conditions, the growth of the industrial
sector should also affect transportation services because airlines, railroads, shipping
and other carriers would be required for the industrial activity. Thus, in order to
detect long-term stock market trends, DJIA and DJTA should be analysed together
(Schannep, 2008). Both indexes are still published today by The Wall Street Journal,
and the Dow theory is typically mentioned in the financial news when the indexes
reach new highs. Some investors still believe that the transportation stocks are a
barometer of economic activity, and any market surge without their backing cannot
be a long-lasting one.
Since the Dow Theory, a countless number of different technical indicators,
methods and strategies have been developed to predict the stock market based on
current and historical prices (P ). Probably most popular are the trend following
strategies, such as the simple moving average (SMA) which maintains a bullish
signal as long as the current index price remains above the average of last n prices,
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i.e.,
SMAn =
Pt + Pt−1 + ...+ Pt−n
n
. (1)
The breadth indicators are another well-known group used in modern technical
analysis. These indicators measure the number of advancing and declining stocks in
the market to determine how many different shares are driving the index returns. Some
investors use breadth indicators also as a measure of investor sentiment (see section
2.5). Nevertheless, most modern technical indicators are lacking both theoretical and
empirical support. For example, Fang et al. (2014) re-examined the predictability of
93 previously presented technical indicators and found that most of them had none
predictability, and even the best predictors could not beat the passive buy and hold
strategy, i.e., the index return.
However, researchers still seem to agree that momentum (Mt) strategies may
have some potential for tactical timing (Ilmanen, 2012). Momentum measures the
rate of change in price over a predefined period of time, typically over past three to
twelve months. The general form of momentum is usually presented as
Mt = log
(︄
Pt
Pt−lag
)︄
∗ 100%. (2)
Researchers have found that most asset classes exhibit positive short-term momentum,
and thereby investors can profit just by buying assets when the prices have risen
and selling the assets when the prices have fallen. Researchers have found that
momentum strategies can be profitably traded both across assets, by buying recent
"winners" and selling recent "losers", but also on a single asset tactically over- and
under-weighting the asset in the portfolio. (Ilmanen, 2012)
Researchers have explained momentum with theories from both rational and
irrational finance. The latter is also known as behavioral finance. Some researcher
believe that momentum is caused by institutional investors’ slow portfolio rebalancing
and decision making (Ilmanen, 2012). The market adapts new information slowly
because significant shifts in institutions’ portfolios require several meetings. Another
theory is the disposition effect, which refers to investors tendency to sell too
early the assets that have increased in value and hold too long the assets that have
decreased in value (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). As a result, asset prices rise and
decline more slowly than they should.
Yet another explanation is the representativeness heuristic, or
"apophenia", which, in turn, refers to people’s tendency to seek and see patterns in
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random information (Ilmanen, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al.,
1982). Due to the representativeness heuristic, investors subconsciously want to
extrapolate the observed trend even further, and buy (sell) securities that have
recently increased (decreased) in value. Finally, momentum is also explained with
investors overconfidence bias. Overconfident investors tend to undervalue public
information and overvalue their own analysis, causing slow price reactions. Other
explanations have included, stop-loss orders, margin calls and portfolio insurance
strategies, i.e., hedging, among others (Antoniou & Koutmos, 2008; Ilmanen, 2012;
Daniel et al., 1998).
2.1.2 Valuation ratios
Valuation ratios, such as the dividend yield (D/P), the earnings yield (E/P), the
price-to-book ratio (P/B) and their different variants, are the most intuitive market
timing indicators. It seems reasonable to assume that prices are not likely to drift too
far away from their normal relationships with fundamental value, such as dividends
or earnings. Therefore, it seems intuitive that when valuation ratios are very high by
historical standards, prices would fall in the future and restore the normal levels. Thus,
it seems reasonable that there would be a relationship between current valuations
ratios and subsequent market returns. Figure 1 seems to confirm the intuition by
implying that lowest valuation ratios would produce the highest returns.
However, Asness and Ilmanen (2017) show that outperforming a passive buy and
hold approach with valuation signals is harder than Figure 1 would suggest. They
show that valuation ratios can drift higher or lower for years or even decades, making
it surprisingly difficult to categorize the current market confidently as "cheap" or
"expensive" in real-time. Asness and Ilmanen found that valuation ratios generally
drifted lower during the early 1900s than during the last 60 years. This upward
drift means that this timing strategy would have got excessively many "sell" signals
in recent decades. For example, their test strategy started to obtain a "sell" signal
already in 1991 rather than 1999 or 2000 when the dot-com bubble finally burst. This
strategy thereby lost almost a decade of profits from equity risk premium (ERP),
demonstrating very well the fundamental difficulty with all TAA strategies: "too
early equals wrong".
Asness and Ilmanen also tested the hypothesis that valuation signals would
work better when applied only at extreme valuations. They show that even this
enhancement does not significantly improve their results. Finally, they try to exploit
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Figure 1: Future returns are higher when market valuations are cheap, S&P500 1871-2019
(Source: Robert Shiller’s website). Figure is constructed by sorting each month of S&P
500 data into nearest P/E group (x-axis), and then computing the average returns for one,
five and ten years ahead (y-axis). Only groups of relevant size are presented, and thereby
groups after P/E 20 and below 7.5 are omitted.
the drifting valuation phenomenon by combining the valuation signal with momentum.
The strategy that used an average of value and momentum signals gave better results
than both signals separately. Asness and Ilmanen argue that combining valuation
ratios and momentum mitigates the risks of value traps, i.e., further drops, and
too early "sell" signals.
Another explanation for the poor predictability of valuation ratios was already
given by Graham et al. (1934). Graham et al. had argued that most financial ratios
were too sensitive to medium-term business cycles and other events, and therefore
were not able to depict firms’ sustainable value. Graham et al. argued that the
current prices should rather be compared to long-term averages of fundamental
value. Professor Robert Shiller popularized this idea by using cyclically-adjusted
price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio
CAPE = P
Ereal 10y avg.
, (3)
to smooth cyclical variations in earnings, and successfully predicted the dot-com
bubble in 2000 and the US housing crash seven years later.
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Other researchers have found that the dividend yield would have the best
timing ability among different valuation ratios. Though up to the beginning of the
1980s, buybacks were minimal. As a result, data for this signal is only available
1980s, whereas other valuation ratios can be tested from the 19th century. Some
practitioners, in turn, prefer value timing strategies that combine the main valuation
ratios into one combined measure (Ilmanen, 2011).
2.1.3 Fed Model
The Federal Reserve (FED) model is an asset allocation analysis comparing earnings
yields and bond yields to determine their relative attractiveness. The Fed model
states that the fixed-income market and the stock market are in equilibrium when the
stock market’s one-year forward-looking earnings yield equals the 10-year Treasury
note yield, i.e.,
E1y, forward
P
= Y10y, GOV. (4)
The Fed model equilibrium can be derived from the Gordon growth model formula
P = D(1 + g)
Rf + ERP − g , (5)
assuming that 100% of the earnings are paid as a dividend (D), the perpetual growth
rate (g) equals zero, the 10-year Treasury note yield equals the risk-free rate (Rf)
and there is no equity risk premium (ERP ). The Fed model suggests that if markets
deviate from the equilibrium, the higher-yielding asset should be over-weighted in
the portfolio.
While the Fed model has been acknowledged to have several drawbacks, it still has
its supporters (Asness, 2002). Most practitioners regard that the basic comparison
between bonds and stocks is valid. Practitioners argue that in practice, stocks and
bonds are competing assets in investors’ portfolios. If one yields significantly better,
the funds start to flow, and the demand increases for the other. On a large scale,
this should eventually return the model’s equilibrium. Another argument supporting
the model concerns the relationship with stock price valuation and the risk-free rate.
Asset pricing theory suggests that the value of stocks should be equal to the sum of
its discounted future cash flows. So, if the risk-free rate drops, the discounted cash
flows will be greater, leading to higher stock price, and thus to lower earnings yield.
As the government bond rate is commonly regarded as a proxy for the risk-free rate,
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this implies that both sides of the equation would then drop by the same amount,
sustaining the equilibrium in the model. (Campbell & Vuolteenaho, 2004)
Despite questionable model assumptions, researchers have found that the Fed
model been able to time the markets. Asness (2002) explained these findings with
a cognitive bias known as money illusion. This bias describes the confusion with
nominal and real, i.e., inflation-adjusted, values. This confusion occurs easily while
using the Fed model because the left-hand side (E1y/P ) is presented in real terms,
whereas the right-hand side (Y10y, GOV) is a nominal value. This is caused by the
different approaches in stock and bond pricing. Inflation should not move stock
prices because future cash flows rise by an amount that offsets the increase in the
discount rate (see section 2.3.2). The increase in one-year forward-looking earnings
is negligible, leaving the left-hand side of the Fed model nonreactive to changes in
inflation. Bond prices, in turn, move in the opposite direction with inflation because
coupons to bondholders are fixed, so the change in the discount rate is not offset. As
a consequence, increasing inflation increases the bond yield (as bond prices drop)
whereas earnings yield remains still. So, Asness proposes that when sufficiently
many investors exhibit money illusion and compare real earnings yield to nominal
bond yields, rising inflation tends to make stocks undervalued (high E1y/P ) while
falling inflation tends to make stocks overvalued (low E1y/P ).
There are many reasons why even finance professionals are prone to confuse
nominal and real values. A common explanation is that people regard that nominal
presentation is just simpler, and usually sufficient first approximation of real value. It
is considerably easier and more natural to think values in nominal terms rather than in
real terms. People also perceive that this mistake is small, and the difference between
the two can be neglected at least when inflation is low and stable. Researchers have
also found evidence that the money illusion diminishes in hyperinflation because
people start to draw attention to inflation more seriously. (Ilmanen, 2011)
Even though empirical findings strongly support the existence of money illusion,
practitioners have still found difficulties to exploit this anomaly profitably. Money
illusion tends to be slow-moving, affecting years or even decades at a time. It is
also difficult to diversify as it tends to affect across asset classes. Its appearance is
also inconsistent. Researchers have found that money illusion can explain the low
valuations during the 1970s and high valuations in the 1990s. However, it still fails to
explain the cheap valuations in the deflationary 1930s and the boom of the housing
market amidst high inflation in 1970s. (Ilmanen, 2011)
Other practitioners have explained the Fed model’s timing ability with reflexivity
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theory. Already in 1987, George Soros suggested that market prices do not just
reflect the expected future outcomes but also can change them (Soros, 2015). He
claims that financial markets operate in "forward-looking bias" that can validate
itself by influencing the fundamentals that market prices should reflect. This theory
originates from sociology, where a concept self-fulfilling prophecy refers to the
phenomenon where "prediction" or expectation comes true simply because people
believe it will. So, some practitioners believe that the Fed model has influenced
markets because of its popularity. In favour of this theory, it is known that influential
market participants, such as the former chairman of FED, Alan Greenspan, has used
it. (Greenspan, 2008)
2.2 Fundamental value
2.2.1 Earnings announcement
Post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) refers to the phenomenon where
stock prices continue moving gradually after the earnings announcement. PEAD
was first discovered by Ball and Brown (1968) who found that after a sharp move
on the earnings announcement day, stock prices tended to drift upwards for several
months if the reported results had exceeded investors’ expectations. In accounting
and financial research, this phenomenon is usually measured with the standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE). SUE is the difference between the stock market’s
aggregated earnings per share (EPS) and the last forecast. Usually SUE standardized
by dividing the measure by its historical standard deviation, i.e.,
SUE = EPS − EPSforecast
σ(EPS − EPSforecast) . (6)
Several theories have been proposed to explain the PEAD. Most widely accepted
view is that the market under-reacts to earnings announcement because of
anchoring. In cognitive psychology, anchoring is a cognitive bias where people
depend too heavily on the initial information, "the anchor", when making
subsequent judgments. Investors exhibit anchoring bias when they try to adjust
their initial analysis with the new additional market information. The subsequent
adjustments are typically insufficient, leaving the new assessments biased towards
the initial analysis. Confirmation bias is another cognitive bias usually related to
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anchoring. It refers to people’s tendency to search for, interpret, favour, and recall
new information in a way that it affirms the prior view. These theories then suggest
that the PEAD occur because investors are too attached to their original analyses
and are slightly stubborn to change their view.
2.2.2 Payout ratio
In a series of papers published since 1979, Robert Shiller proposed that investing is
essentially a social activity. Shiller et al. (1984) discovered that investors spend a
significant share of their leisure time with conversations about investing, reading about
investments or gossiping about others success and failures in investing. They proposed
that, like conversations about any other popular topic, such as food, clothing and
politics, change people’s attitudes, discussions about investing shape also investors’
attitudes about their investments. They found that the attitudes, preferences and
fashions are usually shared widely among the population, and often appear without
any rational reason.
Shiller et al. challenged the efficient market hypothesis by suggesting that asset
price movements are mainly driven by psychology, and particularly, by fashions
and fads. Shiller et al. argued that fashions and fads cause excess variability in
the markets amplifying market reactions. They claimed that some of the people’s
psychological reactions are predictable, and thus stock markets could be predicted
as well, at least to some extent. Especially, they found that the stock market seemed
to overreact to dividends. According to their findings, historically high dividends
seemed to cause over-optimism in the market and increase prices in the short-term.
Afterwards, prices tended to return towards their long-term trends.
Increased dividend is typically considered as an indication of positive future
prospects because managers and the board of directors should have the best
information about the firm’s future. Investors assume that excess cash is distributed
to owners if the management anticipates the following years to be profitable so that
that future cash flows can cover the upcoming capital expenditure. This theory is
also known as dividend signalling. While Shiller et al. did not challenge the ideas
of dividend signalling, they still found the market reactions were unjustified; the
market should not have reacted to dividends as much as it did. They explained this
overreaction both with social elements, such as fads and fashions, and behavioural
biases. Shiller et al. cited particularly Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who had
found that people tend to overreact to small probability events, and under-react to
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large probabilities (currently an element of the prospect theory). Shiller et al.
then suggested that the prospect theory explains the dividend overreaction because
surveys of corporations’ dividend policy had found that managers try to keep
dividends fairly constant through time. Thereby, the deviations in dividend policy is,
in this sense, a low probability event (Lintner, 1956).
In the late 1990s, Lamont (1998) continued the earlier research of Shiller et
al. and found that aggregated dividend payout ratio (D/E) was able to predict
short-term stock market returns. Lamont explained the results with Lintner’s
dividend policy model, which assumes that dividends are paid according to
managements forward-looking payout ratio target. Lamont referred to earlier work
of Lintner and explained that firms tend to set forward-looking targets for payout
ratios according to the amount of NPV positive projects they currently have available.
Managers acknowledge that increased earnings are not always sustainable, and thus
dividend policy is not changed until new earnings levels can be maintained consistently.
Thereby, like dividends alone, increased payout ratio signals that management foresees
more positive future prospects.
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2.3 Real activity
2.3.1 Productivity
Real activity refers to the economy of a single market, or "internal market". A
single market is an economic area in which most trade barriers have been removed
and where people, goods, services and capital can move freely. Researchers have
found that real activity and stock market returns are linked in complicated ways.
To begin with, researchers have been interested in the role of economic productivity,
which is most commonly measured with the gross domestic product (GDP). GDP
represents the final value of the goods and services produced within an economy
during a specified period of time, usually a year. GDP equals the total sum of private
consumption (C), gross investment (I), government spending and investment (G),
and the balance of trade (X-M), i.e.,
GDP = C + I +G+ (X −M). (7)
Due to the definition of GDP, it seems natural to expect that changes in GDP
would affect companies’ sales and other financials, such as earnings, and henceforth
to dividends and market returns.
However, empirical research has shown that GDP and stock market’s aggregated
EPS are surprisingly weakly related. Ilmanen explains that new start-ups, ventures
and other unlisted companies often captures the most GDP growth in the economy.
Arnott and Bernstein (2002) have also suggested that EPS is not affected by GDP
because of equity dilution. Existing firms have tended to issue new shares effectively
along with the economic growth. Due to these weak relations, researchers have
found that GDP expectations and GDP growth do not have significant market return
predictability. (Ilmanen, 2011)
Nonetheless, researchers have found that other productivity measures may add
value for TAA. Based on previous research, one potential measure is the GDP gap,
or "output gap". GDP gap measures the difference between actual and potential
GDP, and it is usually presented in percentages from the potential GDP, i.e.,
gapt =
GDPactual −GDPpotential
GDPpotential
∗ 100%. (8)
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Potential GDP, or economy’s "potential", is the estimated level of production that an
economy should be able to sustain over long-term without negative consequences. This
level depends on supply-side factors of the economy, such as the supply of workers and
their productivity. Potential GDP corresponds to full employment, which means
that anyone willing and able to work at the prevailing rate of wages, is employed.
Full employment thereby means that there is no involuntary unemployment, but
some frictional, structural and voluntary unemployment may still exist.
So, if the GDP gap is negative, an economy is producing at a level that has
"slack". In this situation, the economy is below the full-employment, and thus some
labour, capital, or other resources are underutilized. An economy may also have
positive GDP gap, which means that an economy operates above its full employment.
Positive GDP gap may occur when the economy’s aggregate demand exceeds the
level of demand required to establish full employment. In this case, the shortage in
labour increases the wages, which, in turn, start to increase prices of products and
services, causing an overheating economy and inflation. Thus, both negative and
positive GDP gap is regarded as harmful to the economy. Several researchers have
suggested that the negative effects on real activity explain why both positive and
negative GDP gap has predicted a bearish stock market. (Cooper & Priestley, 2008;
Vivian & Wohar, 2013; Ahmad & Sharma, 2018)
Few productivity-related indicators have also been suggested for TAA. For
example, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) reported predictive relations from
consumption to wealth ratio, or "CAY", which dives the consumers’ aggregate
consumption (ct) by aggregate wealth (at) and aggregate income (yt), i.e.,
cayt =
ct
βaat + βyyt
. (9)
Lettau and Ludvigson explained the findings with a theory where consumers want to
maintain stable consumption over time with respect to their asset wealth and labour
income. Lettau and Ludvigson suggested that, when forward-looking consumers
expect higher future total earnings from wages, investments, and other sources,
they react by raising their consumption in advance. Consumers thereby allow their
consumption to rise above its common relationship to the wealth. Similarly, when
consumers expect lower personal income, they decrease their spending in advance.
Thus, consumption to wealth ratio signals consumers’ future income and spending,
which then affects to real activity, firms’ sales and stock prices. However, the results
of Lettau and Ludvigson were later questioned because the regression coefficients βa
and βy were based on in-sample fit, i.e., using the whole time period data, implying
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that the values of cayt would not have been available to investors in real-time.
2.3.2 Inflation
Inflation is defined as the increase of general price level, reducing the purchasing
power each unit of currency (C) can buy. Inflation is typically caused by overheating
economy (see section 2.3.1) but several other causes also exist. The basic economic
theory between inflation and stock returns was established by Fisher (1930). The
fundamental Fisher equation is
i ≈ r + π, (10)
and it estimates the relationship between nominal (i) and real (r) interest rates under
inflation (π). The equation states that the nominal interest rate is approximately
equal to the sum of the real interest rate and inflation. Fisher hypothesis, or the
"Fisher effect", then follows by stating that real assets should be hedged against
inflation because nominal asset returns move one to one with the discount rate
(see section 2.1.3). Thereby, real stock returns should be independent of inflation
because normal (common) stock represents ownership of the income generated by
real assets. Asset pricing theory also suggests that stock prices should not be affected
because higher inflation and discount rate will be fully compensated by higher nominal
earnings growth. However, empirical research has shown that the Fisher hypothesis
does not hold in practice.
In 1980s, Fama (1981) found a negative relationship between inflation and
stock returns. Fama proposed that this was induced by negative relations between
high inflation and real activity. Fama’s ideas became later known as the proxy
hypothesis. Fama described several reasons why high inflation is typically regarded
as harmful to the overall economy, and why these harm firms as well. For example,
menu cost are the costs to firms resulting from constantly reconsidering and
changing their prices. High inflation also increases economic uncertainty which
makes firms reluctant to make investments because managers are uncertain about
future operational costs, personnel expenses and consumer demand. Postponing
capital expenditures then has several negative consequences, such as falling behind
international competitors.
According to Bekaert and Wang (2010) the negative relation between stock
returns and inflation can be explained with stagflation. Stagflation is an economic
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situation combining stagnant or low economic growth, high unemployment, and high
inflation. Stagflation is a difficult condition because the main actions of monetary
and fiscal policies can not fight both unemployment and inflation at the same
time. Policies aimed at lowering inflation in the long-term will typically increase
unemployment in the short-term. In turn, policies aimed at lowering unemployment
in the short-term translates to even higher inflation in the long-term. Stagflation
can occur when both expansionary, i.e., stimulating, and contractionary, i.e.,
hindering, policies co-occur. For example, if both the central bank expands the
money supply, and the government increases taxes simultaneously, inflation increases
even though economic growth starts to slow. Stagflation is detrimental for firms and
stocks because companies face at the same time rising costs but also lower demand.
Other researchers have found that in certain circumstances, a positive relationship
between inflation and stock returns may occur. Main explanations have included
deflationary environment, the money illusion (see section 2.1.3), and distortions in
reported earnings due to accounting and taxation rules. There are a few different
ways how the accounting and taxation rules may seemingly boost the reported
earnings. For example, inventory profit may occur if the nominal value of the
inventory happens to increase before the inventory is sold. Earnings can also increase
if depreciation becomes insufficient in real terms due to unexpected inflation.
To summarize, all previously presented explanations may contribute to the
complicated relationship between inflation and the stock market. Despite mixed
results and somewhat contradicting theories, most researchers seem still to agree
that steady, low, but slightly positive inflation, such as 2%, would be the optimal
environment for the real activity and the stock returns. Policymakers and central
bankers also seem to support this view because 2% is the targeted inflation rate in
most developed economies. (Ilmanen, 2011)
2.3.3 Interest rates
Interest rate is the amount of money a lender charges for a loan. Interest rates
are usually expressed as a percentage of the original borrowed sum, which is also
known as the principal or the face value. Interest rates can also refer to the yield
to maturity (YTM), which is the annual return earned on a bond if the bond is
bought at the current market price and held until it matures. An essential graphical
presentation of interest rates is the yield curve (YC), which shows the YTMs of
bonds that share the same credit quality but have different maturities. Yield curve
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steepness is usually measured as the interest rate difference between a long-term,
such as 10-year, and a short-term, such as 2-year, government bonds, and thereby
the general form can be written as
Y C = Ylong-term − Yshort-term. (11)
Most of the time, two main factors are affecting the steepness of the yield curve.
The monetary policy of the central bank determines the short-term rates, while the
market’s inflation expectations determine the long-term rates. (Ilmanen, 2012)
Manipulating the front end of the yield curve is the central bank’s primary mean
to control inflation. Most frequently, the central bank manipulates the short-term
interest rates by raising and lowering the target for the overnight rate. The
overnight rate is the interest rate at which commercial banks and the other financial
institutions can lend to each other overnight on an uncollateralized basis. Thus,
the overnight rate is also known as the interbank rate. Manipulating this rate is
essential for the central bank because it influences indirectly to other interest rates as
well, such as mortgage loans, and thus in some extent steers the economy. Typically,
a monetary policy-making body of the central bank decides the target rate a couple
of times in a quarter. Inflation, unemployment, economic growth and the overall
state of the economy are the main drivers affecting the decision. (Dalio, 2012)
However, the central bank cannot force commercial banks to charge that exact
target rate, because the effective overnight rate is determined through negotiations
between the commercial banks. The effective federal funds rate is then calculated as
the weighted average of interest rates across all actual overnight lending transactions.
Therefore, the central bank typically attempts to affect the overnight rate indirectly.
As the overnight rate is usually the lowest available interest rate and only available
to the most creditworthy institutions, it is highly influenced by the yield of the
government bonds. So, the central bank attempts to affect the overnight rate
by manipulating the short-term government bond yields. By buying and selling
government bonds in the open market, the prices and thereby the yields can be
affected. As in general, buying bonds in the open market increases the price and
lowers the yield, and correspondingly, selling bonds decreases the price and increases
the yield. Central bank can also manipulate the overnight rate by entering into a
sale and repurchase agreement (SRA). In SRA, the central bank lends money
to commercial banks for overnight basis and requires assets, such as government
bonds, as collateral. Both mechanisms are jointly referred to as the central bank’s
open market operations (OMO). (Dalio, 2012)
28
Figure 2: Open market operations have historically been rather successful to obtain the
desired overnight rate in the US. (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, US. Upper and lower limits reported separately since 16.12.2008)
The central bank also has other tools to influence to the front-end of the curve.
The discount rate is the interest rate charged to commercial banks and other
financial institutions on loans they receive from the "the discount window", which
is the central bank’s lending facility. The discount rate is usually higher than the
overnight target rate, that encourages banks to borrow from each other and only turn
to the central bank if necessary. Reserve requirements are, in turn, the portions
of deposits that commercial banks must hold either in their own vaults or as deposits
at the central bank. The historical purpose of reserve requirements is to prevent
"bank runs", which refer to a situation where bank’s clients start to withdraw their
money in fear that the bank ceases to function in the near future. In general, the
central bank executes expansionary monetary policy by purchasing bonds through
OMO, lowering the discount rate and decreasing the reserve requirement. In contrast,
the central bank executes contractionary monetary policy by selling bonds through
OMO, increasing the discount rate and increasing the reserve requirements. OMO,
the discount rate and the reserve requirements are collectively referred to as the
three instruments of monetary policy, and the three mechanisms are referred
to as the conventional policy measures. (Dalio, 2018)
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Central bank’s conventional policy measures do not directly affect the back-end
levels of the yield curve. Instead, the long-term rates are mainly driven by the
bond investor’s inflation expectations. The yield curve is upward sloping when the
central bank executes expansionary monetary policy, and the bond market expects
high inflation in the future. Long-term debt has a higher risk, and thus the bond
market rationally compensates the risk with a higher yield. However, the yield curve
flattens or even inverts when the central bank starts to execute contractionary policy
measures, and the bond market starts to anticipate low inflation. The inversion
is rational because the inflation-adjusted yield of the long-term debt still remains
higher than the yield of the short-term debt as the inflation is expected to be lower
in the future. Though, inflation expectations are not solely the only factor affecting
the inversion. Some investors also believe that the long-term government bonds, such
as U.S. 10-year Treasury bond, serve as safe haven. Investors’ safe haven refers
to assets that are expected to retain, or even gain value during periods of economic
downturn. (Ilmanen, 2011)
An inverted yield curve has been believed to predict a recession for a few reasons.
Firstly, contractionary policies aim to hinder economic growth. Secondly, low inflation
is most often associated with recessions. And thirdly, increased demand for safe
haven assets signs economic uncertainty. Researchers have also found that the stock
market crashes before the beginning of a recession because the prices start to reflect
the forthcoming difficulties. Researchers have also suggested that the stock market
crash follows the yield curve inversion, and thereby the stock market crash could
be foreseen. Researchers have explained that yield curve inverts before the stock
market crashes because the bond market is "smarter" than the stock market. The
smart money theory suggests that most bond market participants are professional
investors rather than amateurs, and therefore the bond market should reflect future
expectations more accurately. (Harvey, 1989)
Researchers have also found other relationships between the interest rates and
stock prices. The most direct relationship is the present value effect; lowering
interest rates increase the stock prices because of a milder discount factor. Researchers
have also proposed that an inverted yield curve can also be a self-fulfilling prophesy
(see section 2.1.3). This theory suggests that firms frighten the yield curve inversion
and its threatening signal of recession. As a consequence, companies start to postpone
their new investments and recruitments, which then starts to slow the economic
growth and eventually causes the turn of the business cycle by itself. (Harvey, 1989)
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2.3.4 Monetary base
Most central banks have a dual mandate to maintain both stable price level and
sustainable economic growth. Most of the time, the conventional monetary policies
(see section 2.3.3) are sufficient to steer the economy through the business cycle
in a way that the dual mandate is fulfilled. Occasionally, however, the economic
conditions become so extreme that the conventional measures become ineffective.
Such situations include inflationary depression, i.e. stagflation (see section 2.3.2)
and deflationary depression. (Dalio, 2012)
Deflationary depression is more common between the two. It is defined as an
economic situation combining low economic growth and low inflation. In such a
situation, despite conventional measures lowers the short-term rates to zero, or the
"zero bound", the economy still requires further stimulation to recover. Deflationary
depression is difficult because the central bank can not further lower short-term
interest rates due to liquidity trap. Liquidity trap refers to a situation where
investors start to prefer cash over debt securities because there is no opportunity
cost of holding cash if the nominal interest rate is zero. Therefore, the central
bank will have to resort to unconventional policy measures, which include, for
example, quantitative easing (QE) and helicopter money. Helicopter money,
or "helicopter drop", refers to rather rare monetary policy where the central bank
distributes money directly to citizens in a certain form of dividend. (Dalio, 2012)
QE, in turn, has occurred frequently. In QE, the central bank creates electronic
money, and buys government bonds and other riskier financial assets from private
financial institutions, or "depository institutions". The large-scale asset purchases
inject money into the banking system more than OMO (see section 2.3.3), and
thus, QE is assumed to be more effective than conventional policy measures. In
QE, the total central bank assets (Atotal) increase. Particularly, a balance sheet
construct known as the monetary base (MB), or the "central bank money", grows.
Depository institutions’ cash funds over reserve requirements also rise. These funds
are known as excess liquidity or excess reserves (ER). So, the central bank
desires that QE would ensure low short- and long-term interest rates, i.e., flatten
the yield curve. A low interest rate environment should then encourage businesses
and people to borrow and consume more. Another aim is to help the government to
manage through the recession. In recessions, the government’ income tax usually
drops due to higher unemployment, while the spending on social benefits increases.
QE eases the government to finance the budget deficits by increasing national debt
rather than just increasing taxes. (Dalio, 2012)
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QE affects asset prices through several channels. In credit channel, lower
interest rates decrease firms and households’ cost of borrowing, raise corporations
capital expenditure, and thereby raise asset prices through recovering economy.
However, typically QE programs carry no restrictions for depositary institutions on
how the new central bank money should be used. Commercial banks are not obliged
to lend the money to the households, and thereby the additional liquidity is not
necessarily passed on to the non-financial sector. Instead, typically the institutions
that have sold assets in QE prefer to rebalance the portfolios with listed financial
assets rather than consumer loans. So, another known channel is the portfolio
rebalancing. Rebalancing process inflates across all asset classes because the
central bank has withdrawn a substantial amount of safe haven assets from the
market, and thereby investors need to turn to other riskier assets as well. (Gambetti
& Musso, 2017) Researchers have found that asset classes which are considered riskier
than bonds, such as equities, appreciate gradually over a multiple week window
following the QE announcement days. Mamaysky (2014) explained that in most
funds, allocating investments to riskier assets requires more time because consent
from senior managers is usually required (see momentum theories in section 2.1.1).
Finally, QE announcements have also a signalling effect which refers to central
bank’s view on the forthcoming economic conditions. (Dalio, 2018)
2.3.5 Credit
In fractional reserve banking only a proportion of commercial bank deposits are
backed by actual cash and available for withdrawal. Rest of the deposited capital is
freed for lending. Commercial banks can then create additional "commercial bank
money", or "credit" (Cr), by loaning a proportional amount of each deposit in the
bank. Each granted loan becomes a new deposit in the same or another bank, and a
proportional amount of this new deposit can be then lent further. The established
loop is known as the multiplier effect. Due to the multiplier effect, the initial
central bank money will be lent and deposited multiple times resulting that the
actual money supply, i.e., the money in circulation, will be a multiple of the original
monetary base. The theoretical maximum for the money supply at any given point
of time is expressed with the money multiplier (m):
M = m×MB. (12)
32
The money multiplier is defined as the inverse of the capital reserve ratio, which is
the minimum fraction of the total deposits that commercial banks have to maintain.
(Dalio, 2018)
The money supply is measured with monetary aggregates. Monetary
aggregates categorize the different forms of money, depending on the ease to convert
an asset or holding into actual cash. M1 aggregate (M1), for example, includes the
most liquid portions of the money supply, such as physical currency and deposits
held in the commercial banks. The total amount of credit in the economy, or the
"debt burden", is, in turn, usually presented as a sum of the total debt taken by the
government (GOV), businesses (BUS), households (HH) and non-profit
organizations (NPO). Debt burden is usually expressed as a percentage of total
economic output, i.e.,
Debt burden = DGOV +DBUS +DHH +DNPO
GDP
∗ 100%. (13)
Theories of debt, credit and leverage cycles explain the relationship between the
economy’s total debt and asset prices. The debt cycle theories suggest that the total
debt is the most significant driver of the business cycle. However, contrary to the
common belief, debt is not fundamentally bad for the economy. Most economists
actually believe that debt plays an essential role in allocating resources effectively.
Debt also establishes projects, investments and other opportunities that increase
economic productivity in the long-term. Economists have even argued that too low
debt burden can create as bad or even worse economic problems as having too much
debt. (Dalio, 2012)
However, researchers suggest that market bubbles and debt crises emerge because
the total debt starts to increase faster than the economic productivity. Bubbles
begin to grow when loans are granted too easily, and taken projects do not increase
economic productivity by sufficient amount, i.e., have a negative NPV. Typically,
reckless lending begins during the periods of how high economic growth. Reckless
lending has been explained with herd-behaviour and availability bias. The latter
refers to people’s tendency to weigh recent experience more heavily than would be
appropriate. Asset prices soar because the created credit starts to increase economic
activity, but also because new investors enter the financial markets. New investors
start to enter the markets due to social anxiety known as the fear of missing out
(FOMO). FOMO is defined as a compulsive concern, fear or regret of missing a
potentially rewarding opportunity by not participating in a certain activity. Debt
cycle theories then suggest that increased asset prices then enable further lending
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because the worth of collaterals, such as houses, have risen along with the asset prices.
As the investors’ confidence increases, lending starts to increase also in less regulated
"shadow banking" sector. Shadow banking system refers to credit intermediation
involving entities and financial engineering activities outside of the regulated
banking system. (Geanakoplos, 2010)
In debt cycle theories, the bust of the debt bubble is then triggered by the central
bank’s contractionary monetary policy and especially, the rise of short-term interest
rates. Due to inflation pressures, the central bank starts to increase the short-term
interest rates, causing the yield curve to invert (see section 2.3.3). As credit becomes
more expensive, consumption starts to decrease, which, in turn, decreases people’s
and businesses’ income. Also, debt repayments become more challenging because
borrowing more money to repay the existing loans has become more expensive. As a
result, investors rush to sell their assets, causing asset prices to fall. Due to the falling
asset prices, the worth of collaterals drop as well, and thereby debt defaults start
to cause severe losses to lending institutions. The vicious cycle is then established,
eventually leading to a debt crisis, stock market crash, and to a deleveraging
process where the debt levels within the economy are drastically reduced.
Figure 3: M1 money multiplier is the ratio between M1 monetary aggregate and the
monetary base. The multiplier dropped when deleveraging started in the financial crisis of
2008 (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, US)
Researchers and practitioners have tried to tactically time the burst of the debt
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bubble by monitoring the actions of the biggest lenders and credit institutions. Chava
et al. (2010) has examined the lending standards of Federal Reserve, and Adrian
et al., in turn, has examined the balance sheets of financial intermediaries, such
as shadow banking institutions. Some researchers have also followed the credit
impulse
d2(Cr/GDP )
dt2 =
Crt − Crt−1
GDPt
− Crt−1 − Crt−2
GDPt−1
, (14)
which measures the change in newly issued credit (Cr). Practitioners have also
monitored the credit spread, which is the difference between low- and high-grade
corporate bonds, i.e.,
CS = YLow-grade − YHigh-grade. (15)
2.4 World economy
2.4.1 Exchange rates
Exchange rate is defined as a price at which one currency will be exchanged for
another. An exchange rate can be presented in relation to one another currency or
in relative to a "basket" of multiple foreign currencies. Most exchange rates are free-
floating, and thus are determined by supply and demand in the foreign exchange
(FX) market. The prices in the FX market are highly influenced by real activity.
For example, if all else equal, inflation depreciates the currency because it decreases
the purchasing power. Thereby, changes in the money supply affect as well because
money supply affect inflation (see section 2.3.4). Increasing interest rates, in turn,
appreciate the domestic currency because higher interest rates provide higher rates to
lenders, thereby attracting more foreign capital to the economy. However, the debt
burden and negative balance of trade, i.e., the trade deficit, typically depreciate the
currency due to increased defaulting risk and economic uncertainty. Researchers have
also found a variety of other factors driving the FX market, including geopolitical
events, terms of international trade, among others. (Sekmen, 2011)
However, because the FX market is a "zero-sum game" with relative prices, all
currencies do not react to changes in the global macroeconomic envrionment in
35
the same way. For example, while most currencies depreciate, some currencies are
regarded as safe haven assets and tend to appreciate systematically during negative
events. A currency can become a safe haven asset in a few different ways. For
example, if the central bank maintains continuously low interest rates, that currency
may become attractive for currency carry trading. In a currency carry trade,
FX traders attempt to profit from the difference in the interest rates between two
currencies. FX traders borrow the currency with the low interest rate, exchange that
to the other currency, and then invest with the higher interest rate. Currency carry
trading is profitable if the exchange rate does not change and offset the interest rate
difference. The safe haven property of a currency can then be explained with FX
traders rush to close the currency carry positions when global uncertainty increases,
leading to a rapid peak in demand and price during negative macroeconomic events.
(Yau & Nieh, 2006)
Yau and Nieh (2006) have found that safe haven currencies show early warning
signs of bearish stock markets. The main explanation is that, like the bond market,
the FX market is considered "smarter" than the stock market (see section 2.3.3). Even
though retail investors are a growing segment in the FX market, their trading volume
is nonexistent compared to professional investors. The most common strategies,
such as carry trades, also require high leverage, which is usually unreachable for
most amateur investors. In addition, professional investors in the FX markets have
significantly better access to the data, and they have excessive resources to research
the market continuously. Thus, exchange rates are mainly moved by professional
investors, and the FX market is thereby considered rather efficient.
However, whether or not varying exchange rate favours the domestic stock market,
depends on the industrial structure within the economy. Stocks benefit from the
currency depreciation if the economy is export-driven. As a result of deprecation,
exporters improve their competitiveness in the international markets, resulting in
higher sales and profits. (Yau & Nieh, 2006). However, excessively volatile currency is
harmful for stocks because hedging the foreign exchange risk becomes more expensive,
and typically hedging instruments do not completely lessen the lost trade volume.
(Sekmen, 2011)
2.4.2 International trade
The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is the most followed indicator of international trade
activity. The BDI is a weighted average of international shipbrokers’ assessments of
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shipping costs with the Capesize, Panamax and Supramax dry bulk transport
vessels. The three dry bulk vessel types differ on their weight carrying capacity and
size. Vessel size determines the vessel’s ability to travel through different maritime
trade canals, such as the Panama Canal. Therefore, different vessels have significantly
different shipping costs and voyages, i.e., routes. The assessments used in the BDI,
are given daily for 20 internationally essential shipping routes: 5 Capesize, 5 Panamax
and 10 Supramax voyages. The selected voyages are meant to have large enough a
trade volume to represent the global maritime freight transport. In the BDI, the
shipping costs are measured as time chartering (TC) averages, which include fuel
costs, port charges, commissions, and a daily crew hire. The BDI formula is then
written as
BDI = 0.4 ∗ TCavg. 5 Capesize + 0.3 ∗ TCavg. 5 Panamax + 0.3 ∗ TCavg. 10 Supramax10 .
(16)
The supply of dry bulk cargo ships is rather tight and inelastic because it takes
several years to build a new vessel. Therefore, the BDI is mainly driven by the
demand for dry bulk, which includes mainly industrial raw materials, such as coal,
iron ore, steel, cement, and grain. The BDI is thereby considered as a forward-looking
indicator of global industrial activity. For this reason, movements in the BDI have a
significant influence on political and economic decision-making. Industrial companies
also use the BDI for both operative and strategic decisions. One of the main reasons
for the popularity of the BDI is that governments, associations or investors cannot
influence or manipulate it easily. However, financial researchers have found that
the growth rate of BDI is able to predict stock market trends in the short-term.
Researchers have explained that in most economies, the BDI predicts the development
of manufacturing industry that will then drive the other sectors and henceforth asset
prices as well. (Bakshi et al., 2010; Apergis & Payne, 2013)
2.4.3 Metal prices
The interpretation of industrial metal prices is analogous to the Baltic Dry Index
signal. Industrial metals are, by definition, raw materials for the industrial sector, and
thereby the prices reflect the demand for global industrial production and construction.
However, unlike the BDI, metal prices are also influenced by supply-side factors, such
as the global metal production capacity, which weakens the relationship with the
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stock market (Jacobsen et al., 2018). In contrast, precious metals, and especially
gold, have similarities with the safe haven currencies (see section 2.4.1). Gold is
commonly seen as a reliable safe haven asset because it has a historical legacy as
a store of value, currency and wealth. Researchers have also suggested that gold’s
bright, shiny and positive image possibly contributes to investors preference for gold
during economic downturns (Huang & Kilic, 2019; Baek, 2019). However, researchers
have found only mild relationships between the gold price and stock market returns.
(Erb & Harvey, 2013)
2.5 Market sentiment
2.5.1 Sentiment surveys
Market sentiment, or "investor sentiment", is defined as investors overall feeling and
attitude towards the market. Various measures and indicators have been developed
in order to approximate the market sentiment. Probably the simplest indicators of
investor sentiment are the sentiment surveys where investors answer to questionnaires
in regular time intervals. Typically, sentiment surveys are conducted weekly, and
investors choose among three alternatives: "bullish", "bearish" or "neutral", depending
on their view on the stock market over the following months. Sentiment surveys
have been arranged at least since 1989 when Rober Shiller started to conduct them
at Yale University as a part of his research (Brown & Cliff, 2005). However, the
results of the surveys are typically published in the form of bull–bear ratio
Bull–bear ratio = BullishBullish+Bearish ∗ 100%, (17)
which accounts only the bullish and bearish investors, and ignores the neutral
respondents.
Researchers have found a negative relationship between "bullish" survey results
and stock market returns. Thus, the bull–bear ratio is a contrarian indicator and
thereby encourages to trade in contrast to the prevailing sentiment. According to
Stambaugh et al. (2012), investor sentiment may increase prices excessively due to
overoptimism and herd-behaviour. Stambaugh et al. have explained that such
overvaluation may then prevail even for a long period of time, because most investors
are either restricted or otherwise unwilling to short-sale. Stambaugh et al. found
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that some professional investors are prohibited from selling short, and most private
investors, in turn, find short selling riskier or otherwise uncomfortable. Thus, most
investors tend to take no position at all rather than sell short if they believe that
the market is overvalued. Stambaugh et al. therefore suggest that during periods of
high market-wide sentiment, the market tends to be slightly overpriced and future
returns will thereby be low. Researchers have found that such mispricing does not
occur when the survey results are natural or bearish level.
2.5.2 Implied volatility
Since introduced in 1993, The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility
Index (VIX) has been considered as a premier gauge of investor sentiment. VIX
measures the implied volatility of 30-day S&P 500 index options derived from the
Black-Scholes formula. According to option pricing theory, higher volatility of the
underlying asset makes both put and call options more valuable, because there will
be a higher probability that the option will expire in the money. Thus, high measures
of VIX imply that investors expect a sharp upward or downward movement in the
market. However, as the market crashes only downwards, the implied volatility
accounts more the downside risk. For this reason, the VIX is also known as the "fear
index", and associated with bearish market expectations. The volatility index can be
calculated with the formula
σ2 = 2
T
∑︂
i
△Ki
K2i
eRTQ(Ki)− 1
T
[︃
F
K0
− 1
]︃2
, (18)
where
VIX = σ ∗ 100
T = Time to expiration
F = Forward index level derived from index option prices
K0 = First strike below the forward index level, F
Ki = Strike price of ith out-of-the-money option
△Ki = Interval between strike prices
R = Risk-free interest rate to expiration
Q(Ki) = The midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each option with strike Ki
Several theories have been proposed to explain the negative relationship between
VIX and the stock market. For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) suggest
that higher implied volatility makes market-makers, or "liquidity providers", more
conservative and less active in facilitating the transactions in the market. Declined
39
market-making decreases the market liquidity and thereby also prices. Adrian and
Shin (2010), in turn, suggest that liquidity and prices decline because financial
intermediaries, such as brokers and commercial banks, have certain preventive risk
management mechanisms which start to constrain lending in times of high VIX.
Other researchers have also proposed that hedge funds tend to lose some of their
assets under management (AUM) in times of high implied volatility. In such times,
hedge funds typically reduce the leverage as well. Hedge funds’ decreasing AUM and
leverage thereby cause more selling in the market and put downward pressure on the
prices. (Nagel, 2012)
2.5.3 Put–call ratio
The put–call ratio (PCR) is another popular indicator of investor sentiment. The
ratio represents a proportion between all purchased put and call index options on a
given day. The PCR is presented either in volume or dollar-weighted basis, i.e., for
example
PCR = Put volumeCall volume ∗ 100%. (19)
As put options are used to hedge against falling prices, a large proportion of puts to
calls indicates bearish investor sentiment. However, most investors use the PCR as a
contrarian indicator (see section 2.5.1). Contrarian investors believe that the volume
of sold put and call options should be roughly equal over time. Thus, deviations from
the historical average imply that the market may be turning excessively bullish or
bearish. Thus, for a contrarian investor, a large proportion of puts or calls indicates
excessive sentiment and potential market overreaction. The contrarian investors
have also argued that PCR may reveal the positions of the institutional investors
because most institutional investors need to hedge their positions. For example,
a large proportion of puts may then imply that institutional investors have long
positions which they just have hedged, causing the high PCR. Thus, contrarian
investors also follow the "smart money" (see sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.1). (Martikainen
& Puttonen, 1996)
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2.5.4 Fund flow
Fund flow (FF) represent the net amount of new money invested in a fund in a given
period of time. The general form can be written as
FF = Inflow−OutflowNet Assets ∗ 100%. (20)
The fund flow of exchange-traded funds (ETF) is typically interpreted as a
measure of investor sentiment: positive ETF flow indicates that investors expect
a bullish market and negative fund flow correspondingly implies that investor are
feeling bearish. However, empirical research has found that ETF flow predicts just
the opposite market reaction: future returns are high when ETF flow is low, and
future returns are low when ETF flow is high. Thus, like the bull–bear and put–call
ratios (see section 2.5.1 and 2.5.3), ETF flow is regarded as a contrarian indicator.
(Frazzini & Lamont, 2008)
The negative relationship between ETF flow and the stock market has been
explained with the dumb money effect. The dumb money effect suggests that
amateur investors, rather than professionals, drive ETF flows. Researchers have
explained that ETF funds predict low returns because most behavioural biases, such
as excessive optimism or pessimism, affect especially amateur investors. Amateur
investors are also known to be the least informed segment of investors, and therefore
they are most likely to buy and sell at the wrong time. Another proposed explanation
is that certain hedge funds tend to switch their holdings to ETFs when they anticipate
uncertain times in the market. Hedge funds find some ETFs more liquid than their
underlying assets, and thereby ETFs are less risky alternative during a bear market.
Thus, increased ETF flow may reflect both amateur investors’ excessive sentiment,
but also professional investors’ preventive actions. (Tabs, 2010)
2.6 Other phenomena and anomalies
2.6.1 Seasonal regularities
Higher average returns in January is probably the best-known seasonal anomaly. The
January effect is usually explained with a rebound from an earlier drop in December.
Researchers have suggested that market declines in December because investors try to
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reduce their capital gain taxes by selling poorly performed investments at a loss before
the year’s end. The January effect has also been explained with corporations annual
bonus payments which occur mostly in the end of December or in the beginning
of January. Some of the bonus money is then used for stock purchases, causing
increasing stock prices.
Another well-known anomaly is the Halloween effect which, in turn, refers to
lower returns in May–October. This regularity is usually explained with summer
holidays. Research suggests that investors are generally more risk-averse during a
summer vacation. Most financial professionals, such as equity research analyst and
investment managers, are also less active or entirely out of offices during the summer
months.
In recent years, end of month effect has attracted attention due to the publication
of Etula et al. (2015). They found that payments of pensions funds, dividends of
corporate treasuries, and distributions of mutual funds, all occur at the turn of a
month. Etula et al. show that in every month, financial assets worth billions of
US dollars are liquidated and distributed to pensioners and investors before the
month-end. The money is then partially re-invested at the beginning of the next
month, causing a regular return-pattern around the turn of every month. In addition
to the January, Halloween and end of month effects, researchers have also found higher
average returns around major holidays and macroeconomic news announcements.
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3 Framework for empirical testing
3.1 Statistical background
3.1.1 Statistical hypothesis testing
Statistical hypothesis testing is a method of statistical inference that is used to
interpret and draw conclusions about a population using sample data. A hypothesis
test evaluates two mutually exclusive statements: the null hypothesis (H0) and the
alternative hypothesis (H1). The null hypothesis generally states that there is no
significant association between variables, or that there is an insignificant relationship
between measured phenomena. The null hypothesis often has a form "there is no
difference". Alternative hypothesis is contrary to the null hypothesis, suggesting
that a statistically significant relationship exists. The alternative hypothesis, or the
"research hypothesis", is often the logical opposite of the null hypothesis, and thus
usually has a form "there is a difference". The null hypothesis is assumed to be true
until statistical evidence indicates otherwise, in which case it is rejected. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
Sample’s deviation from the null hypothesis is measured with a test statistic.
The probabilities for different test statistic values are obtained from the null
distribution, which is the probability distribution given that the null hypothesis is
correct. The null distribution value associated with the observed test-statistic value
is denoted as the probability value (p) By the definition of the null distribution,
p-value measures the probability of obtaining similar or more extreme test statistic
value just by chance, given that the null hypothesis is true. Therefore, the smaller
the p-value, the stronger the statistical evidence that the null hypothesis should be
rejected. The null hypothesis is rejected, and results are considered statistically
significant if the p-value is less than or equal to the pre-defined significance level
(α), i.e.,
p ≤ α→ reject H0 (21)
p ≥ α→ accept H0. (22)
Two conceptual errors have an essential part in statistical hypothesis testing. A
type I error, or "false positive" finding, is the rejection of a true null hypothesis,
while a type II error, or "false negative" finding, is the non-rejection of a false null
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hypothesis. In simpler terms, type I error incorrectly finds a relationship between
variables although there is none, while type II error fails to detect a relationship that
really exists. The type I error rate (α) is the probability of making a type I error in
a test. The type I error rate is at most as high as the predefined significance level.
Similarly, the type II error rate (β) is the probability of making a type II error in
a test. It is, in turn, related to the power of a test, which is the probability that the
test correctly rejects the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true (see
table 2). In most disciplines type I errors are considered more severe than type II
errors. This originates from the traditions in legal trials, where type II error occurs
when a guilty person is set free and remain unpunished. This is considered far less
serious error than type I error where an innocent person is convicted and suffers the
sentence.
True H0 False H0
Correct inference Type II error
Accepted (true negative) (false negative)
H0 Confidence level β
1− α
Type I error Correct inference
Rejected (false positive) (true positive)
H0 Significance level Power
α 1− β
Table 2: Type I and type II errors
3.1.2 Multiple hypothesis tests
The multiple testing problem arises when a statistical analysis involves multiple
hypothesis tests, each having a potential to produce statistically significant results,
i.e., a "discovery". Multiple testing is problematic because significance levels that
apply to each test individually are rarely sufficient for the whole set, or "family", of
simultaneous tests. Unless the performed tests are perfectly positively dependent,
i.e., identical, the probability to make at least one false discovery increases rapidly
along with the number of performed tests. Therefore, the significance level requires
an adjustment to compensate for the multiple comparisons. In general, the more
simultaneous tests are performed, the more stringent significance level is required.
However, the number of performed test is not the only determinant for the
appropriate significance level correction. The similarity, or the "cross-sectional
dependency" between the tests, affects as well. For example, if the performed tests
are perfectly independent, then the probability of making one or more false discoveries
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is
P (Type I error) = α
P (Not making a type I error) = 1− α
P (Not making a type I error in m tests) = (1− α)m
P (Making one or more type I errors in m tests) = 1− (1− α)m.
In this case, suppose we have, for example, 100 independent tests, and each test
has a significance level of 5%. The chance to make at least one false discovery is
1− (1− 0.05)100 ≈ 99.4%
Another important special case of multiple hypothesis testing is a set of perfectly
dependent tests. In this case, the same test is just performed multiple times, and
as a result, there is effectively only one hypothesis tested. So, in this case, the
probability of type I errors does not change, and thereby there is no need to adjust
the significance level. For example, suppose we have 100 identical tests, and each
test has a significance level of 5%. The probability of making at least one type I
error equals 1− (1− 0.05)1 = 5%
3.1.3 Multiple testing correction
A variety of different approaches has been developed to adjust the level of significance
for multiple comparisons. Two commonly used approaches for controlling type I
errors are the family-wise error rate (FWER)
FWER = P (V ≤ 1), (23)
and the false discovery rate (FDR)
FDR = E
[︃
V
R
]︃
. (24)
FWER is the probability of making at least one type I error when multiple
hypotheses are tests. FDR, in turn, is the expected proportion of type I errors
among the set of rejected null hypotheses. If R is the total amount of rejected null
hypotheses, and m0 is the number of true null hypotheses, FWER and FDR can be
defined using the following table
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True H0 False H0 Total
Accepted H0 U T m−R
Rejected H0 V S R
Total m0 m−m0 m
Table 3: Possible outcomes of multiple tests
Classical FWER control procedures include the Bonferroni correction (Bonferroni
et al., 1936), the Šidák correction (Šidák, 1967), the Tukey’s range test (Tukey
et al., 1949), the Holm–Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979), the Hochberg’s step-
up procedure (Hochberg, 1988), the Dunnett’s correction (Dunnett, 1955), the
Scheffé’s method (Scheffé, 1953) and the Harmonic mean p-value (Good, 1958). In
turn, the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) and the
Benjamini–Yekutieli procedure (Benjamini et al., 2001) are classical solutions for
controlling the FDR.
Classical multiple testing controls have certain advantages and disadvantages. In
general, FWER controls are well protected against type I errors, but the statistical
power of FWER controls is usually weak, especially when the number of tests increases.
Due to low power, there is a low probability that FWER control detects the real
discoveries, i.e., correctly rejects the false null hypothesis. FDR controls, in turn,
have high power, but it comes with the expense of an increased number of type I
errors. For these reasons, FWER controls are preferred in applications where the
number of tested hypotheses remains small, and when the consequences of a single
false discovery are severe. FDR controls, in turn, are preferred in applications where
the amount of hypotheses is excessively large, and when a small proportion of false
discoveries is tolerable. Thus, economic and financial research usually favours FWER
controls. In contrast, FDR controls are often appropriate, for example, in genetic
epidemiology where relationships with genes and thousands of different diseases are
under investigation. In genetic epidemiology, a small proportion of false discoveries
is tolerable because these can be identified in subsequent studies.
That being said, financial researchers have found that most classical FWER
controls are still too strict even with a low number of performed tests. Researchers
have argued that the classical FWER controls too often detect nothing, i.e., nothing
can be declared statistically significant in the presence of multiple testing. In most
classical FWER controls, this "over-conservatism" is caused by the assumption of
complete independence between the tests. Financial researchers have argued that
almost all economic and financial variables are interlinked in complicated ways,
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and thereby the tests should not be considered independent. So, motivated by the
shortcomings of the classical procedures, more sophisticated FWER controls have
been developed in recent years. The goal of these methods has been to guard the
type I errors without excessively sacrificing the statistical power. The most promising
approaches have turned out to be the resampling methods, such as permutation
tests and bootstrapping. (Westfall et al., 1993; Romano & Wolf, 2005)
However, financial researchers have regarded that the permutation tests are
somewhat challenging due to their excessive computational requirements.
Bootstrapping, in turn, has received support. In many recent financial publications,
bootstrapping has been preferred because bootstrapping methods do not have to
appeal to any asymptotic theories in order to provide inference. For example, an
assumption about the shape of the null distribution, such as normality, is not
required. Distribution assumptions are not required because bootstrapping preserves
the dependency information in the data. Particularly, the statistical moments are
maintained. Moments are the statistics obtained from a random sample, and they
characterise the shape of the sampling distribution, which is the theoretical
probability distribution of the population. The mean (µ) and variance (σ2) are
the first and the second moments of a sampling distribution, and skewness and
kurtosis are the third and the fourth moments, respectively. Moments beyond 4th
order are referred to as the higher-order statistics and they describe the
non-linear dependencies in the data. As bootstrapping preserves both lower- and
higher-order moments, the joint null distribution of the multiple tests can be
approximated directly from the sample with the use of sampling distribution.
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3.2 Method for TAA model creation
3.2.1 Initialization: panel regression and data transformations
The goal of the method is to create a TAA model that consists only statistically
significant TAA signals. The method includes an algorithm that iterates three stages
and adds a new signal to the model after each iteration. The three stages are repeated
as long as new statistically significant signal can be found to improve the model
incrementally. During each iteration, the confidence level is adjusted considering the
total amount of candidate signals remaining and their mutual dependence (see section
3.1.2). The applied technique is a bootstrapping based FWER control procedure
(see section 3.1.3).
So, suppose there is a T × 1 vector Y of equity market returns that T ×M
candidate signal matrix X attempts to predict. Each column of this matrix X
presents a time-series of a TAA signal’s test variable, and vector Y presents the
market return of the following period. The whole multi-dimensional data, or "panel
data", can be presented in a matrix form where rows denote time periods and
columns denote test variables
[︂
Y X1 X2 · · · Xm
]︂
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
y2 x1,1 x1,2 · · · x1,m
y3 x2,1 x2,2 · · · x2,m
y4 x3,1 x3,2 · · · x3,m
y5 x4,1 x4,2 · · · x4,m
y6 x5,1 x5,2 · · · x5,m
... ... ... . . . ...
yt xt−1,1 xt−1,2 · · · xt−1,m
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(25)
The method includes modelling relationships between Xi and Y . As typical for
financial research, predictive relationships are modelled with linear regressions. The
parameters of the regressions are estimated with the the ordinary leased squares
(OLS) method, which minimizes the sum of squared residuals, i.e., the distances
between the predictive model and data points. The goodness-of-fit is measured
with the coefficient of determination (R2), which describes the proportion of the
variance that each Xi can explain. While linear regressions and the OLS method are
widely used in a variety of different applications, there are still certain requirements
which need to be fulfilled in ordered to justify their usage. The main general
assumptions include:
• The modelled relationship is linear.
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• The mean of the error terms is zero.
• The error term variance is constant over time (also known as the
"homoscedasticity of residuals").
• The error term values are not autocorrelated.
• Independent variables Xi are uncorrelated with the error term.
• In multivariate regressions, no variable can be linearly approximated from the
other variables, i.e., there is no multi-collinearity.
Certain transformations, are typically required for the data so that the
assumptions of the linear regression and OLS method are met. Data
transformations are mathematical functions which are applied to every data point in
the time series. Through the use of data transformations, linear regressions can also
model relatively complex relationships, such as nonlinear dependency, assuming that
the appropriate transformations to linearity can be found. With linear regression
models, it is usually sufficient to ensure that all used time series are, at least
approximately, stationary, which means that the statistical properties, such as
mean, variance, auto-correlation and the error term, are all constant over time.
Visualizations, such as plots of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial
autocorrelation function (PACF), are typically used to determine whether
transformations have been able to obtain sufficient stationarity. Data
transformations may also be applied in order to change the interpretability of the
variables. Main transformations include:
• Difference: transforms each data point in the time series into difference
between the current and the previous value
zt = xt − xt−1. (26)
Difference is typically applied for variables which are expected to affect through
the changes in the absolute values.
• Log difference: converts each data point into the relative difference between
the current and the previous value
zt = log xt − log xt−1. (27)
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Log difference is considered as an appropriate transformation for variables that
are expected to function through the changes but do not have any natural
reference point, such as zero. Log difference, thereby, reveals more information
about the magnitude of the difference.
• Z-score: standardizes a time series to obtain a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one
zt =
xt − µ
σ
. (28)
Z-score is an in-sample measure because µ and σ are calculated using the whole
sample. As a result, normal z-score values are not stable over time, and thereby
would not have been available to investors in real-time. Another variant, the
rolling z-score, uses only that data which would have been available at that
given point of time, i.e., µ and σ are calculated for each zt using only values
x1, x2...xt. However, as the data increases gradually, the very first rolling z-score
values usually fluctuate aggressively due to very few used data points. Therefore,
a certain warmup perdiod is usually required to remove the first rolling z-
score values from the inference. Rolling z-score standardization is typically
applied to variables that are assumed to affect through a deviation from the
historical mean. Multiple variables may also be combined into one composite
z-score by taking a mean of the individual z-score values. Composite z-score is
used to gauge different variables combined effect.
3.2.2 Stage 1: Orthogonalizing the X matrix
The algorithm begins after the required data transformations have been applied. So,
suppose that k (0 ≤ k ≤ M) TAA signals have already been selected to the TAA
model and there is M − k candidate signals remaining. As M − k is also the number
of performed tests during each iteration. So, the first step is to orthogonalize the
X matrix. In this context, orthogonalization refers to dividing the time series of
each candidate signal into components and then removing that component which
seems to have incremental predictability. Incremental predictability of the X matrix
can be separated and removed with vector projections. Vector projections model
a linear relationship between each candidate signal Xk+j and residual vector Y e,k
Xk+j = c+ dY e,k +Xek+j, j = 1, ...,M − k. (29)
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Here c an is the intercept, d is the slope and Xek+j denotes the error term of the
projection. During the first iteration the Y e,k equals the Y vector because no signals
have yet been selected to the model, and thereby model residuals are considered
to be the original Y vector values. As the Xek+j is the error term of the projection,
it should be independent and uncorrelated with the residuals of the current model.
The matrix X can then be orthogonalized by replacing each candidate signal column
with their corresponding Xek+j vectors. As a result, the new X matrix should not
provide any incremental predictability, and thereby all individual regressions between
candidate signals and model residuals should have zero R2 values.
3.2.3 Stage 2: Bootstrapping with replacement
New orthogonalized data matrix (30) is shown below. Here Y e,k is the residual vector
of the current model, Xs is the submatrix of preselected variables and Xe is an
orthogonalized submatrix of candidate variables:
[︂
Y e,k Xs Xe
]︂
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ye,k2 x
s
1,1 · · · xs1,k xe1,k+1 · · · xe1,m
ye,k3 x
s
2,1 · · · xs2,k xe2,k+1 · · · xe2,m
ye,k4 x
s
3,1 · · · xs3,k xe3,k+1 · · · xe3,m
ye,k5 x
s
4,1 · · · xs4,k xe4,k+1 · · · xe4,m
ye,k6 x
s
5,1 · · · xs5,k xe5,k+1 · · · xe5,m
... ... ... ... ... . . . ...
ye,kt x
s
t−1,1 · · · xst−1,k xet−1,k+1 · · · xet−1,m
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(30)
Even though the orthogonalized X matrix should not be able to explain the
model residuals, some statistical predictability may start to emerge if the matrix rows
are bootstrapped with replacement. This technique constructs a new matrix of
same size by mixing rows of the orthogonalized matrix (30) randomly, and in a way
that an individual row can emerge multiple times. One bootstrap could look like the
following:
[︂
Y e,k Xs Xe
]︂ Bootstrap=====⇒
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⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ye,k8 x
s
7,1 · · · xs7,k xe7,k+1 · · · xe7,m
ye,k13 x
s
12,1 · · · xs12,k xe12,k+1 · · · xe12,m
ye,k41 x
s
40,1 · · · xs40,k xe40,k+1 · · · xe40,m
ye,k8 x
s
7,1 · · · xs7,k xe7,k+1 · · · xe7,m
ye,k116 x
s
115,1 · · · xs115,k xe115,k+1 · · · xe115,m
... ... ... ... ... . . . ...
ye,k13 x
s
12,1 · · · xs12,k xe12,k+1 · · · xe12,m
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
[︂
Y e,kboot X
s
boot X
e
boot
]︂
(31)
After bootstrapping,M−k regressions are made between Xeboot and Y e,kboot. As rows
were bootstrapped with replacement, the R2 values can deviate even significantly
from zero. So, the highest R2 value is saved among the M − k regressions, and then
this step is repeated 10 000 times. After a large number of repeats, the saved R2
values can be ordered and presented as an empirical distribution. This distribution
approximates the joint null hypothesis that none of the M − k candidate signals can
incrementally improve the model. Thereby, the empirical distribution represents the
null distribution of the multiple tests.
3.2.4 Stage 3: Signal selection
Once the null distribution has been obtained, the signal selection process follows the
steps of standard statistical hypothesis testing (see section 3.1.1). Test statistics, i.e.,
the "real" R2 values, for each TAA signal can be obtained by performing individual
regressions between Y e,k and each Xi from the original panel data (25). The p-values
for these test statistic values can then be obtained from the approximated null
distribution.
During each iteration, the null hypothesis is that none of the remaining candidate
signals have additional explanatory power to predict the future equity market returns.
The null hypothesis is rejected, and the candidate signal with the highest R2 value is
considered statistically significant if the corresponding p-value is less than or equal to
the predefined significance level α (see 21). This TAA signal will then be included in
the model and added to the k preselected signals. As a result, the amount of candidate
signals, M − k, is decreased by one. In such a case, the algorithm starts over from
stage 1, and then the remaining candidate signals will try to explain the residuals of
this new augmented model. However, if the threshold for statistical significance is not
exceeded, the algorithm terminates and concludes that the preselected k variables
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are the only statistically significant signals for the TAA model.
3.3 Backtesting
TAA strategies are evaluated in terms of risk-adjusted returns generated from out-of-
sample backtests. Backtests apply historical TAA signal values and generate returns
based on trades that would have occurred in the past using the rules defined by the
given TAA strategy. Transaction costs and taxes are excluded, i.e., the markets are
assumed to be frictionless, and thereby backtests can be conducted by using the
stationary panel data (25). As a high measure of a signal indicates either positive or
negative future returns, the signals indicating a bearish market are inverted so that
high measure in the data always indicates positive market return.
Some constructed test variables can have only two or three values, while others
have an unlimited continues scale of different measures. For the integer variables,
the backtested trading rule is simple: 1 indicates a long position, -1 a short position
and 0 no position. However, in order to ease the interpretation of the other signals,
each data point of a continuous variable is transformed into a rolling percentile
rank (RPR) score. Rolling percentile rank reflects the percentage of previous data
points that are equal to or lower than the given value. Rolling percentile rank is
thereby an out-of-sample measure because it uses only data that would have been
available at any given point of time, i.e., each zt uses only values x1, x2...xt.
xRPRt =
|xi ≤ xt : i ∈ {1, 2...t}|
|x1, x2...xt| ∗ 100% (32)
1: Rolling percentile rank
After the RPR transformation, a simple trading rule can also be applied to
continuous variables. If a signal’s RPR value exceeds 75%, a long position is taken.
Correspondingly, a short position is taken if the RPR value is below 25%, and no
position is taken otherwise.
53
Algorithm 1: Backtest trading rule for continuous variables
if xRPRt ≥ 75% then
zt = yt
else if xRPRt ≤ 25% then
zt = −yt
else
zt = 0
end
Finally, the risk-adjusted returns are measured with the sharpe ratio (SR)
SR = R−Rf
σ
, (33)
which is the average annualized return (R) above the risk-free rate (Rf ) divided by
returns’ annual standard deviation, i.e., volatility. The risk-free rate for the Sharpe
ratios is approximated with the 1-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).
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3.4 Test setting
Variable construction is presented in the Table 4. Each TAA signal is expected to
have either a positive or negative correlation with the future market return. The
expected correlations are based on theories and rationales proposed in the previous
literature. Each TAA signal is associated with a quantitative test variable which
replicates the test variables from previously published papers. However, some data
transformations are required in order to obtain stationarity and the desired final
forms for the test variables (see section 6 for regression diagnostics).
Data is presented in the table 5. Various sources are required to construct the
appropriate variables for the US and European markets. Primary sources include the
financial databases of Bloomberg L.P. and Thomson Reuters Corporation.
However, some economic data has also been retrieved from the researchers’ web sites
and central banks’ databases directly. Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
refers to the database maintained by the research division of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW) refers to the
ECB’s online data delivery service. In general, the central bank data is preferred
because it is assumed to be most reliable and accurate. However, some ECB’s data
is only available for the euro area (EA) and not for the whole of Europe.
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4 Results and discussion
The correlation matrices are presented in the Tables 6 and 7. In multiple hypothesis
testing, correlations represent the statistical dependency structure of the multiple
tests. Correlations show that most TAA signals exhibit strong positive or negative
dependency. Therefore, neither complete dependence nor complete independence
between the tests would be an appropriate assumption for the TAA model creation.
Testing each signal, for example, at 5% significance level, would have substantially
higher than 5% probability for one or more false discoveries. In turn, controlling
tests, for example, with a classical Bonferroni correction (pi ≤ αm), would require
p-value practically zero, which is an overly conservative requirement for signals that
are not entirely independent either.
Whether causal or not (see section 1.2), correlations also reveal interesting
statistical relationships between different signal pairs. In line with previous findings
of Asness and Ilmanen (2017), technical indicators, i.e., the Dow theory and
momentum, are negatively correlated with valuation ratios (assuming price in the
denominator) and the Fed model. The dividend yield and the payout ratio are, in
turn, surprisingly weakly related. It seems that the pair behaves somewhat
differently after all. Correlations among the real activity indicators are mostly
consistent with the proposed economic theories (see section 2.3). For example, the
GDP gap and inflation have a positive correlation, which supports the rationale that
an overheating economy increases the price level. Inflation and the yield curve have
a negative correlation, which, in turn, supports the explanation that the central
bank’ monetary policy and inflation are interlinked. The balance sheet of the central
bank, however, is positively correlated with excess reserves and M1 monetary
aggregate but, the relationship with the yield curve is surprisingly weak. The sign of
the correlation is positive in the US and negative in the EA. Other signals, such as
sentiment indicators and seasonal indicators, have mostly low correlations.
TAA model creation is presented in the Tables 8-13. The left-sided tables show
the variable selection process, and the right-sided tables show the created TAA
model. The tests were made for both US and European markets with three different
prediction horizons: week, month and quarter. The time periods were determined
by the shortest time series in the data. However, in order to guarantee a sufficient
warm-up period, rolling z-score values used also data before the beginning of the
presented time period.
In order to illustrate the effect of multiple testing, each signal is associated with
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a p-value which would have corresponded the signal’s R2 value in an individual
test. The p-values are obtained from the Student’s t-distribution, which is a
widely used distribution in statistical analysis. The t-distribution assumes that the
error term is normally distributed, and therefore the t-distribution is also symmetric
and bell-shaped. However, the t-distribution has heavier tails than the normal
distribution because t-distribution takes the sample size into account. In general, the
smaller the sample, the fatter the tails. T-distribution becomes eventually identical
to the normal distribution when the sample size approaches infinity.
Several signals could be declared statistically significant by ignoring the fact that
multiple signals and samples were tested. However, the last line of the left-sided
tables show the threshold for statistical significance when the multiple testing is taken
into account. The central bank balance sheet is then the only signal which exceeds
the multiple testing hurdle and could be thereby declared statistically significant.
However, the balance sheet signal seems to be significant only in the US and only with
a week prediction horizon. Therefore, only one TAA model is created. The sign of
the coefficient is, however, negative, which contradicts the expected correlation with
future returns (see Table 4). OMO and QE activities were assumed to raise prices,
and thereby predict bullish market (see section 2.3.4). The finding is, nevertheless,
exciting and could be explained, for example, with the signalling effect channel. OMO
and QE announcement may signal that expansionary monetary policies are required
because the central bank is uncertain about the future economic conditions.
However, even though the other signals are not statistically significant, some of
the R2 values are still rather high. Depending on the sample, the shadow banking
sector, ETF flow and the M1 monetary aggregate seem to explain a substantial
amount of the returns’ variance. However, as multiple tests were made, it is not
surprising that some statistical predictability starts to emerge.
TAA strategy backtests are presented in the Tables 14-19. The trade signal, i.e.,
whether the signal is backtested as a "bullish" or "bearish" indicator, is determined by
the expected correlation with future returns (see Table 4). The actual correlations,
however, show that with several signals it actually would have been more profitable
to trade just the opposite direction than prior literature suggested. However, few
signals, such as the inflation rate and ETF flow, seem to beat the passive buy and
hold strategy occasionally. Though the transaction costs were excluded, and the
index performance is rather low due to the dot-com crash at the beginning of the
millennium.
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5 Conclusion
Tactical asset allocation (TAA) is a dynamic strategy that actively adjusts the
portfolio’s strategic allocation mix. The objective of TAA is to exploit short-term
variation in the expected returns of different asset or sub-asset classes. Market
timing is an extreme form of TAA that involves frequent shifts into and out of asset
classes in an attempt to time the market peaks and troughs. In systematic TAA
strategies, allocation decisions are based on a quantitative forecasting model. In a
TAA model, asset class performances are predicted with TAA signals, which are
most often different financial and economic variables.
Investors have tried to forecast the equity risk premium as long as the markets
have existed. The modern technical analysis began already at the end of 19th century,
when Charles Dow developed principles for predicting equity returns with the Dow
Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Transportation Average indexes. Since
the Dow theory, investors have tried to use also other market value indicators, such
as moving averages, momentum, valuation ratios and the Fed model. Investors
soon, however, noticed the fundamental difficulty with all TAA and market timing
strategies: "too early equals wrong". Since 1960s, researchers have reported promising
results also with company fundamentals, such as dividends, payout ratio and earnings.
Cognitive theories, such as the prospect theory, anchoring and confirmation bias
seemed to explain the market reactions to dividend and earnings announcements,
thereby challenging the efficient market hypothesis.
By the 1980s, real activity indicators had started to attract researchers attention.
Productivity measures were soon found fragile, but rising inflation and interest rates
appeared to predict low stock market returns. The main explanations included the
proxy hypothesis and the central bank’s conventional monetary policies. An inverted
yield curve seemed to predict market crashes because contractionary monetary policy
and low inflation expectations were early signs of a forthcoming recession. After
millennium, researchers found that unconventional policy measures, in turn, seemed
to inflate asset prices. The relationship between quantitative easing and the stock
market was not only explained with the credit channel and portfolio rebalancing
but also with signalling effects. Some practitioners also explained the economic
downturns with theories of debt, credit and leverage cycles, and tried to forecast the
business cycle turns by monitoring the prevailing credit conditions.
In the 2010s, investors started to pay attention also to the global economic
indicators. The stock markets in export-driven economies seemed to benefit from
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currency deprecation. Increases in the Baltic Dry Index and metal prices also
appeared to predict bull markets through their link to the global industrial activity.
Certain currencies and the gold price, in turn, gained a reputation as investors’ safe
haven. In recent years, investor sentiment indicators, such as sentiment surveys, the
VIX, the put–call ratio and ETF flows, have also got researchers interest. Most
sentiment indicators, however, have signalled market overreaction and herd-behaviour,
and thereby encouraged to trade against the prevailing sentiment. In recent years,
researchers have also hinted that the seasonal return patterns, such as the turn of
the month effect, could be profitably exploited.
Extensive research on equity market prediction has now been reviewed and
retested on post-millennium data. While introducing the test methodology, the
basics of statistical hypothesis testing are reviewed. Especially, the concept of type
I error, i.e., the probability of a false discovery, is revisited. Due to definition of
type I error, the significance level of a single hypothesis test does not equal to the
significance level of multiple tests unless the set of tests are completely identical.
Thereby, if the significance level in multiple testing is not adjusted appropriately,
considering the number of tests performed and their mutual dependency, the test
results become seriously spurious and misleading.
The test results imply that false discoveries are endemic in the vast TAA and
market timing literature. Multiple testing, sample selection and several other
questionable assumptions have established the seemingly promising results of prior
literature. The strategies that happened to work well in the backtests of the most
cited journal articles, now fail miserably in out-of-sample testing. Few signals, such
as the inflation rate and ETF flow, beat occasionally the passive buy and hold
strategy, but the results are still not statistically significant if the multiple testing is
taken into account. The only statistically significant signal is the the balance sheet
of the Federal reserve (FED). However, in contradiction to previous research, the
changes in the FED’s balance sheet have predicted negative stock market returns.
To conclude, even if the expected equity risk premium might vary over time,
investors should not tactically change the equity weight in the strategic investment
portfolio. Robust empirical research shows that even in the absence of transaction
costs, the systematic TAA and market timing strategies have not been able to
generate significant excess returns on out-of-sample periods. However, if investors
are still tempted to try such strategies, the inflation rate and ETF fund flows seem
to be the most relevant measures to follow in the US and European markets. Further
investigation on tactical timing in the emerging markets is left for future research.
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6 Appendix
Table 4: Variable construction
Variable
name
Expected
correlation
with future
return
Theories and rationales Test variable (xt) Data
transformations
(zt)
Market
return
(Not
relevant)
(Dependent variable) Pt+prediction horizon Log difference
Dow theory Positive Industrial sector requires
transportation services
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if (PDJIAt > SMADJIA200 )
∧(PDJTAt > SMADJTA200 )
−1 if (PDJIAt < SMADJIA200 )
∧(PDJTAt < SMADJTA200 )
0 otherwise
SMA ≡ Simple moving average
(see Equation 1)
(Not required)
Momentum:
3m
Positive Portfolio rebalancing,
the disposition effect,
representativeness heuristic,
overconfidence bias, stop-
loss orders, margin calls,
portfolio insurance strategies
log
(︂
Pt
Pt−3m
)︂
(Not required)
Momentum:
12m
Positive (same as above) log
(︂
Pt
Pt−12m
)︂
(Not required)
Shiller PE Negative Intuition, narratives P
Ereal 10y avg.
Rolling z-score
Dividend
yield
Positive (same as above) D
P
Rolling z-score
Value
composite
Negative (same as above) P
E
, P
E1y, forecast
, P
D
,
P
D1y, forecast
, P
B
, P
B1y, forecast
Composite
z-score
Fed model Positive Money illusion, reflexivity
theory
E1y, forward
P
− Y10y, GOV (Not required)
Payout ratio Positive Dividend signalling, prospect
theory, Lintner’s dividend
policy model
D
E
Difference
Standardized
unexpected
earnings
Positive Anchoring, confirmation bias EPS−EPSforecast
σ(EPS−EPSforecast) (Not required)
GDP gap Negative Full employment GDPactual−GDPpotential
GDPpotential
Difference
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Consumption
to wealth
ratio
Positive Consumers prefer stable
consumption
ct
βaat+βyyt Difference
Inflation
target: 2%
Negative Proxy hypothesis,
stagfaltion, deflation, money
illussion, accounting and
taxation rules
π − 2% (Not required)
Yield curve:
10y-2y
Positive Smart money, self-fulfilling
prophesy
Y10y, GOV − Y2y, GOV Rolling z-score
Central bank
balance sheet
Positive Real activity, portfolio
rebalancing
Atotal Log difference
Excess
reserves
Positive (same as above) Re Difference
Monetary
aggregate:
M1
Positive Herd-behaviour, availability
bias, FOMO
M1, Log difference
Debt to GDP
ratio
Negative (same as above) DGOV+DBUS+DHH+DNPO
GDP
Log difference
Shadow
banking
Negative (same as above) Atotal Difference
Credit
impulse
Negative (same as above) Crt−Crt−1
GDPt
− Crt−1−Crt−2
GDPt−1
(Not required)
Credit
spread
Negative (same as above) YBAA − YAAA Rolling z-score
Domestic
currency
Negative Exports and domestic
currency negatively related
Cdomestic
Cforeign
Log difference
Safe haven
currency:
JPY
Negative Currency carry, smart
money
CJPY
Cdomestic
Log difference
Safe haven
currency:
CHF
Negative (same as above) CCHF
Cdomestic
Log difference
Baltic Dry
Index
Positive Demand of raw materials
drives the world economy
(see Equation 16) Log difference
Industrial
metals
Positive (same as above) Pt Log difference
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Gold Negative Safe haven asset Pt Log difference
Bull-bear
ratio
Negative Overoptimism, herd-
behaviour, short-selling
limitations
Bullish
Bullish+Bearish Difference,
Rolling z-score
CBOE
Volatility
Index
Negative Market makers and
hedgefunds less active
(see Equation 18) Difference
Put-call ratio Positive Excessive sentiment, smart
money
Put volume
Call volume Rolling z-score
ETF flow Negative Dumb money, hedge fund’s
risk management
ETFcreation−ETFredemption
Total market cap Rolling z-score
January
effect
Positive Rebound from December,
annual bonus payments
{︃
1, if t ∈ {Jan}
0, otherwise
(Not required)
Halloween
effect
Positive Summer holidays
{︃
1, if t ∈ {Nov—Apr}
0, otherwise
(Not required)
Turn of
month effect
Positive Pensions, dividends,
distributions of mutual
funds
{︃
1, if t ∈ {T-3—T+3}
0, otherwise
T ≡ last day of the month
(Not required)
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Table 5: Data
Variable Raw data Frequency Period Source
Market return MSCI US index Daily 1969-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe index Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Dow theory DJIA Index Daily 1917-2019 Thomson
Reuters
DJTA index Daily 1988-2019 Thomson
Reuters
Momentum:
3m
(see market return)
Momentum:
12m
(see market return)
Shiller PE Cyclically-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio
of S&P 500 index
Monthly 1871-2019 Robert Shiller
website
Dividend yield MSCI US dividend yield Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe dividend yield Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Fed model MSCI US price-earnings ratio Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
10 year US treasury rate Daily 1990-2019 Thomson
Reuters
Value MSCI US price-earnings ratio Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
composite MSCI US price-earnings ratio 12 month
forecast
Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI US dividend yield Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI US dividend yield 12 month
forecast
Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI US price-to-book ratio Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI US price-to-book ratio 12 month
forecast
Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe price-earnings ratio Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe price-earnings ratio 12
month forecast
Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe dividend yield Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe dividend yield 12 month
forecast
Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe price-to-book ratio Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe price-to-book ratio 12
month forecast
Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Payout ratio MSCI US dividend payout ratio Daily 1995-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe dividend payout ratio Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Standardized
unexpected
earnings
S&P500 Earnings per share - actual
surprise: difference between the actual
EPS and the average of last broker
estimates
Quarterly 1996-2019 Thomson
Reuters
68
GDP gap Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimates of GDP gap in the United
States
Quarterly 1947-2019 Bloomberg
International monetary fund (IMF)
estimates of GDP gap in Europe
Quarterly 1992-2020 Bloomberg
Consumption
to wealth ratio
(See "Monetary Policy and Asset
Valuation" by Bianchi, Lettau, and
Ludvigson)
Quarterly 1951-2019 Martin Lettau
website
Inflation target:
2%
Annual percent change in consumer price
index (CPI) in the US
Monthly 1948-2019 FRED
Annual percent change in CPI in the EA Monthly 1996-2019 FRED
Yield curve: 10 year US treasury rate Daily 1977-2019 Bloomberg
10y-2y 2 year US treasury rate Daily 1977-2019 Bloomberg
10 year Germany governement bond yield Daily 1990-2019 Bloomberg
2 year Germany governement bond yield Daily 1990-2019 Bloomberg
Central bank
balance sheet
Total assets of Federal Reserve (FED)
balance sheet
Weekly 2002-2019 FRED
Total assets of Federal Reserve (FED)
balance sheet
Weekly 1994-2019 Bloomberg
Total assets of European Central Bank
(ECB) balance sheet
Monthly 1999-2019 ECB SDW
Excess reserves Excess liquidity of depository institutions
in the US
Weekly 1984-2019 Bloomberg
Excess liquidity of depository institutions
in the EA
Weekly 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Monetary
aggregate: M1
Sum of currency in circulation and
overnight deposits in the US
Monthly 1981-2019 Bloomberg
Sum of currency in circulation and
overnight deposits in the EA
Monthly 1980-2019 Bloomberg
Debt to GDP Total loans of all sectors in the US Quarterly 1945-2019 FRED
ratio Total debt securities of all sectors in the
US
Quarterly 1945-2019 FRED
Shadow
banking
Total value of shadow banking sector in
the US
Quarterly 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Total value of shadow banking sector in
the EA
Quarterly 2003-2019 Bloomberg
Credit impulse New credit issued in the US Quarterly 1949-2019 Bloomberg
New credit issued in the EA Quarterly 2000-2019 Bloomberg
Credit spread Aaa Corporate Bond Yield in the US Daily 1983-2019 Bloomberg
Baa Corporate Bond Yield in the US Daily 1986-2019 Bloomberg
Aaa Corporate Bond Yield in the EA Daily 1994-2019 Bloomberg
69
Baa Corporate Bond Yield in the EA Daily 1994-2019 Bloomberg
Domestic
currency
The nominal effective exchange rate of US
dollar
Daily 1994-2019 Bloomberg
The nominal effective exchange rate of the
euro
Daily 1996-2019 Bloomberg
Safe haven USD/JPY nominal exchange rate Daily 1971-2019 Bloomberg
currency: JPY EUR/JPY nominal exchange rate Daily 1986-2019 Bloomberg
Safe haven USD/CHF nominal exchange rate Daily 1971-2019 Bloomberg
currency: CHF EUR/CHF nominal exchange rate Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
Baltic Dry
Index
Baltic Dry Index Daily 1985-2019 Bloomberg
Industrial
metals
Bloomberg Industrial Metals Subindex Daily 1991-2019 Bloomberg
Gold The spot gold price in US dollars Daily 1920-2019 Bloomberg
Bull-bear ratio American Association of Individual
Investors (AAII) Investor Sentiment
Survey
Weekly 1987-2019 Bloomberg
CBOE
Volatility Index
CBOE Volatility Index Daily 1990-2019 Bloomberg
Put-call ratio Volume put-call ratio of equity and index
options traded on CBOE
Daily 1995-2019 Thomson
Reuters
ETF flow Net of created and redeemed new shares
of ETFs listed in the US, trailing quartile
Weekly 1996-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI US index Daily 1969-2019 Bloomberg
Net of created and redeemed new shares
of ETFs listed in the EA, trailing quartile
Weekly 2000-2019 Bloomberg
MSCI Europe index Daily 1999-2019 Bloomberg
January effect (see market return)
Halloween
effect
(see market return)
Turn of month
effect
(see market return)
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Table 8: TAA model creation, market: US, prediction horizon: week, time period: 2000-
2019, significance level: 5%
R2 p-value
Dow theory 0.000 0.754
Momentum: 3m 0.001 0.429
Momentum: 12m 0.000 0.881
Shiller PE 0.000 0.798
Dividend yield 0.004 0.046
Value composite 0.002 0.176
Fed model 0.000 0.639
Payout ratio 0.000 0.514
Standardized unexpected earnings 0.000 0.807
GDP gap 0.001 0.226
Consumption to wealth ratio 0.001 0.378
Inflation target: 2% 0.006 0.012
Yield curve: 10y-2y 0.000 0.778
Central bank balance sheet 0.049 0.000
Excess reserves 0.002 0.196
Monetary aggregate: M1 0.001 0.326
Debt to GDP ratio 0.000 0.871
Shadow banking 0.001 0.346
Credit impulse 0.001 0.345
Credit spread 0.001 0.234
Domestic currency 0.000 0.826
Safe haven currency: JPY 0.013 0.000
Safe haven currency: CHF 0.001 0.354
Baltic Dry Index 0.002 0.204
Industrial metals 0.003 0.092
Gold 0.000 0.485
Bull-bear ratio 0.000 0.828
CBOE Volatility Index 0.012 0.000
Put-call ratio 0.006 0.012
ETF flow 0.013 0.000
January effect 0.001 0.430
Halloween effect 0.002 0.207
Turn of month effect 0.001 0.330
Multiple testing 0.049 0.000
Dependent variable:
y
‘Central bank balance sheet‘ −0.311∗∗∗
(0.043)
Constant 0.001∗
(0.001)
Observations 1,015
R2 0.049
Adjusted R2 0.048
Residual Std. Error 0.023 (df = 1013)
F Statistic 51.849∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1013)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 9: TAA model creation, market: Europe, prediction horizon: week, time period:
2003-2019, significance level: 5%
R2 p-value
Momentum: 3m 0.000 0.768
Momentum: 12m 0.000 0.979
Dividend yield 0.001 0.389
Value composite 0.000 0.798
Payout ratio 0.001 0.339
GDP gap 0.005 0.048
Inflation target: 2% 0.002 0.238
Yield curve: 10y-2y 0.002 0.176
Central bank balance sheet 0.010 0.004
Excess reserves 0.007 0.016
Monetary aggregate: M1 0.001 0.319
Shadow banking 0.011 0.002
Credit impulse 0.005 0.039
Credit spread 0.006 0.025
Domestic currency 0.002 0.212
Safe haven currency: JPY 0.005 0.034
Safe haven currency: CHF 0.000 0.686
Baltic Dry Index 0.000 0.851
Industrial metals 0.005 0.036
Gold 0.001 0.300
CBOE Volatility Index 0.001 0.486
ETF flow 0.003 0.090
January effect 0.000 0.768
Halloween effect 0.001 0.296
Turn of month effect 0.001 0.290
Multiple testing 0.024 0.000
73
Table 10: TAA model creation, market: US, prediction horizon: month, time period:
2000-2019, significance level: 5%
R2 p-value
Dow theory 0.000 0.886
Momentum: 3m 0.003 0.408
Momentum: 12m 0.003 0.441
Shiller PE 0.000 0.824
Dividend yield 0.011 0.115
Value composite 0.004 0.366
Fed model 0.000 0.864
Payout ratio 0.000 0.906
Standardized unexpected earnings 0.001 0.653
GDP gap 0.008 0.166
Consumption to wealth ratio 0.006 0.237
Inflation target: 2% 0.028 0.010
Yield curve: 10y-2y 0.000 0.950
Central bank balance sheet 0.061 0.000
Excess reserves 0.000 0.933
Monetary aggregate: M1 0.000 0.894
Debt to GDP ratio 0.000 0.917
Shadow banking 0.012 0.098
Credit impulse 0.004 0.314
Credit spread 0.016 0.056
Domestic currency 0.003 0.440
Safe haven currency: JPY 0.015 0.065
Safe haven currency: CHF 0.001 0.709
Baltic Dry Index 0.018 0.039
Industrial metals 0.027 0.012
Gold 0.001 0.585
Bull-bear ratio 0.000 0.925
CBOE Volatility Index 0.015 0.064
Put-call ratio 0.025 0.016
ETF flow 0.073 0.000
January effect 0.000 0.973
Halloween effect 0.012 0.101
Multiple testing 0.311 0.000
Table 11: TAA model creation, market: Europe, prediction horizon: month, time period:
2003-2019, significance level: 5%
R2 p-value
Momentum: 3m 0.010 0.170
Momentum: 12m 0.001 0.687
Dividend yield 0.010 0.161
Value composite 0.004 0.353
Payout ratio 0.002 0.522
GDP gap 0.026 0.024
Inflation target: 2% 0.007 0.248
Yield curve: 10y-2y 0.015 0.093
Central bank balance sheet 0.104 0.000
Excess reserves 0.031 0.014
Monetary aggregate: M1 0.022 0.037
Shadow banking 0.076 0.000
Credit impulse 0.028 0.020
Credit spread 0.043 0.003
Domestic currency 0.011 0.152
Safe haven currency: JPY 0.028 0.019
Safe haven currency: CHF 0.010 0.159
Baltic Dry Index 0.004 0.370
Industrial metals 0.061 0.000
Gold 0.005 0.313
CBOE Volatility Index 0.053 0.001
ETF flow 0.012 0.124
January effect 0.001 0.596
Halloween effect 0.010 0.155
Multiple testing 0.112 0.000
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Table 12: TAA model creation, market: US, prediction horizon: quarter, time period:
2000-2019, significance level: 5%
R2 p-value
Dow theory 0.003 0.626
Momentum: 3m 0.010 0.378
Momentum: 12m 0.000 0.879
Shiller PE 0.014 0.314
Dividend yield 0.044 0.067
Value composite 0.026 0.162
Fed model 0.001 0.817
Payout ratio 0.072 0.018
Standardized unexpected earnings 0.003 0.622
GDP gap 0.020 0.215
Consumption to wealth ratio 0.018 0.239
Inflation target: 2% 0.104 0.004
Yield curve: 10y-2y 0.000 0.915
Central bank balance sheet 0.158 0.000
Excess reserves 0.017 0.265
Monetary aggregate: M1 0.000 0.905
Debt to GDP ratio 0.000 0.951
Shadow banking 0.058 0.036
Credit impulse 0.012 0.338
Credit spread 0.021 0.205
Domestic currency 0.000 0.971
Safe haven currency: JPY 0.007 0.458
Safe haven currency: CHF 0.009 0.412
Baltic Dry Index 0.079 0.013
Industrial metals 0.041 0.076
Gold 0.000 0.914
Bull-bear ratio 0.003 0.649
CBOE Volatility Index 0.000 0.898
Put-call ratio 0.034 0.111
ETF flow 0.095 0.006
January effect 0.001 0.794
Halloween effect 0.008 0.442
Multiple testing 0.373 0.000
Table 13: TAA model creation, market: Europe, prediction horizon: quarter, time period:
2003-2019, significance level: 5%
R2 p-value
Momentum: 3m 0.024 0.219
Momentum: 12m 0.000 0.864
Dividend yield 0.005 0.567
Value composite 0.001 0.787
Payout ratio 0.003 0.656
GDP gap 0.062 0.045
Inflation target: 2% 0.013 0.362
Yield curve: 10y-2y 0.052 0.067
Central bank balance sheet 0.131 0.003
Excess reserves 0.021 0.244
Monetary aggregate: M1 0.183 0.000
Shadow banking 0.181 0.000
Credit impulse 0.078 0.024
Credit spread 0.065 0.040
Domestic currency 0.002 0.710
Safe haven currency: JPY 0.022 0.236
Safe haven currency: CHF 0.063 0.043
Baltic Dry Index 0.140 0.002
Industrial metals 0.086 0.018
Gold 0.000 0.938
CBOE Volatility Index 0.001 0.841
ETF flow 0.059 0.052
January effect 0.004 0.605
Halloween effect 0.000 0.996
Multiple testing 0.235 0.000
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Table 14: TAA strategy backtests, market: US, prediction horizon: week, time period:
2000-2019
Trade
signal
Correlation
with future
return
Cumulative
return (%)
Annualized
return (%)
Sharpe ratio
Dow theory Bull -0.01 4.8 0.2 -0.09
Momentum: 3m Bull -0.02 14.0 0.7 -0.06
Momentum: 12m Bull 0.00 48.8 2.1 0.03
Shiller PE Bear -0.01 -58.4 -4.4 -0.39
Dividend yield Bull 0.06 77.0 3.0 0.09
Value composite Bear -0.04 -24.3 -1.4 -0.21
Fed model Bull 0.01 10.6 0.5 -0.07
Payout ratio Bull -0.02 4.0 0.2 -0.10
Standardized unexpected earnings Bull 0.01 0.7 0.0 -0.12
GDP gap Bear 0.04 -52.3 -3.7 -0.43
Consumption to wealth ratio Bull -0.03 -40.9 -2.7 -0.34
Inflation target: 2% Bear -0.08 107.9 3.8 0.15
Yield curve: 10y-2y Bull -0.01 -57.3 -4.3 -0.49
Central bank balance sheet Bull -0.22 -56.1 -4.2 -0.49
Excess reserves Bull -0.04 -79.3 -7.8 -0.56
Monetary aggregate: M1 Bull -0.03 -36.9 -2.3 -0.29
Debt to GDP ratio Bear 0.01 -34.0 -2.1 -0.27
Shadow banking Bear -0.03 78.3 3.0 0.11
Credit impulse Bear 0.03 -36.4 -2.3 -0.29
Credit spread Bear -0.04 137.7 4.6 0.20
Domestic currency Bear -0.01 23.1 1.1 -0.04
Safe haven currency: JPY Bear -0.12 221.8 6.2 0.36
Safe haven currency: CHF Bear -0.03 4.3 0.2 -0.11
Baltic Dry Index Bull 0.04 91.1 3.4 0.12
Industrial metals Bull -0.05 -74.4 -6.8 -0.60
Gold Bear -0.02 71.6 2.8 0.09
Bull-bear ratio Bear -0.01 21.8 1.0 -0.05
CBOE Volatility Index Bear 0.11 -43.5 -2.9 -0.32
Put-call ratio Bull 0.08 123.6 4.2 0.21
ETF flow Bear -0.12 411.9 8.8 0.54
January effect Bull -0.02 -10.2 -0.6 -0.53
Halloween effect Bull 0.04 146.3 4.7 0.22
Turn of month effect Bull -0.03 -13.4 -0.7 -0.30
Buy and hold 106.4 3.8 0.13
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Table 15: TAA strategy backtests, market: Europe, prediction horizon: week, time period:
2003-2019
Trade
signal
Correlation
with future
return
Cumulative
return (%)
Annualized
return (%)
Sharpe ratio
Momentum: 3m Bull -0.01 -0.6 0.0 -0.14
Momentum: 12m Bull 0.00 18.2 1.0 -0.06
Dividend yield Bull -0.03 -30.1 -2.2 -0.31
Value composite Bear 0.01 -20.1 -1.4 -0.25
Payout ratio Bull -0.03 101.3 4.4 0.22
GDP gap Bear -0.07 91.4 4.1 0.26
Inflation target: 2% Bear -0.04 246.6 7.9 0.45
Yield curve: 10y-2y Bull 0.05 -22.9 -1.6 -0.31
Central bank balance sheet Bull -0.10 -62.9 -5.9 -0.71
Excess reserves Bull -0.08 -40.5 -3.1 -0.35
Monetary aggregate: M1 Bull -0.03 -12.2 -0.8 -0.22
Shadow banking Bear 0.10 -51.9 -4.4 -0.52
Credit impulse Bear -0.07 116.5 4.9 0.22
Credit spread Bear 0.08 -6.9 -0.4 -0.27
Domestic currency Bear 0.04 -23.8 -1.7 -0.29
Safe haven currency: JPY Bear -0.07 30.7 1.7 -0.01
Safe haven currency: CHF Bear -0.01 -19.8 -1.3 -0.24
Baltic Dry Index Bull 0.01 -23.7 -1.6 -0.27
Industrial metals Bull -0.07 -67.7 -6.7 -0.67
Gold Bear -0.04 34.1 1.8 0.00
CBOE Volatility Index Bear 0.02 -13.8 -0.9 -0.20
ETF flow Bear -0.06 88.4 4.0 0.16
January effect Bull -0.01 0.2 0.0 -0.40
Halloween effect Bull 0.04 105.7 4.5 0.22
Turn of month effect Bull -0.04 -14.2 -0.9 -0.36
Buy and hold 94.3 4.2 0.14
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Table 16: TAA strategy backtests, market: US, prediction horizon: month, time period:
2000-2019
Trade
signal
Correlation
with future
return
Cumulative
return (%)
Annualized
return (%)
Sharpe ratio
Dow theory Bull -0.01 16.6 0.8 -0.12
Momentum: 3m Bull 0.05 40.7 1.8 -0.05
Momentum: 12m Bull 0.05 42.0 1.8 -0.05
Shiller PE Bear 0.01 -69.7 -6.0 -0.62
Dividend yield Bull 0.10 68.3 2.7 0.02
Value composite Bear -0.06 6.4 0.3 -0.16
Fed model Bull -0.01 25.0 1.2 -0.09
Payout ratio Bull -0.01 -24.5 -1.4 -0.31
Standardized unexpected earnings Bull -0.03 -6.6 -0.4 -0.24
GDP gap Bear 0.09 -48.4 -3.3 -0.53
Consumption to wealth ratio Bull -0.08 -53.0 -3.8 -0.54
Inflation target: 2% Bear -0.17 76.1 3.0 0.04
Yield curve: 10y-2y Bull 0.00 -57.9 -4.3 -0.64
Central bank balance sheet Bull -0.25 -6.0 -0.3 -0.23
Excess reserves Bull 0.01 -6.5 -0.3 -0.20
Monetary aggregate: M1 Bull -0.01 49.6 2.1 -0.03
Debt to GDP ratio Bear 0.01 -22.5 -1.3 -0.31
Shadow banking Bear -0.11 113.8 4.0 0.14
Credit impulse Bear 0.07 -35.9 -2.3 -0.41
Credit spread Bear -0.12 96.3 3.5 0.09
Domestic currency Bear -0.05 16.9 0.8 -0.13
Safe haven currency: JPY Bear 0.12 -53.7 -3.9 -0.58
Safe haven currency: CHF Bear -0.02 40.3 1.8 -0.06
Baltic Dry Index Bull 0.14 62.6 2.5 0.01
Industrial metals Bull 0.16 116.1 4.0 0.12
Gold Bear -0.04 121.0 4.2 0.13
Bull-bear ratio Bear 0.01 7.5 0.4 -0.23
CBOE Volatility Index Bear -0.12 -43.9 -2.9 -0.43
Put-call ratio Bull 0.16 104.1 3.7 0.14
ETF flow Bear -0.27 -70.9 -6.2 -0.82
January effect Bull 0.00 6.6 0.3 -0.48
Halloween effect Bull 0.11 169.8 5.2 0.23
Buy and hold 109.7 3.9 0.09
Table 17: TAA strategy backtests, market: Europe, prediction horizon: month, time
period: 2003-2019
Trade
signal
Correlation
with future
return
Cumulative
return (%)
Annualized
return (%)
Sharpe ratio
Momentum: 3m Bull 0.10 49.2 2.5 0.00
Momentum: 12m Bull 0.03 21.5 1.2 -0.11
Dividend yield Bull -0.10 -33.9 -2.5 -0.43
Value composite Bear 0.07 -47.3 -3.9 -0.54
Payout ratio Bull 0.05 57.6 2.8 0.04
GDP gap Bear -0.16 79.2 3.7 0.17
Inflation target: 2% Bear -0.08 204.1 7.1 0.44
Yield curve: 10y-2y Bull 0.12 10.2 0.6 -0.19
Central bank balance sheet Bull -0.32 -65.9 -6.4 -0.98
Excess reserves Bull -0.18 -66.8 -6.6 -0.80
Monetary aggregate: M1 Bull -0.15 -0.4 0.0 -0.22
Shadow banking Bear 0.27 -63.0 -5.9 -0.87
Credit impulse Bear -0.17 76.4 3.5 0.09
Credit spread Bear 0.21 -10.8 -0.7 -0.42
Domestic currency Bear 0.10 -54.3 -4.7 -0.71
Safe haven currency: JPY Bear 0.17 -34.5 -2.6 -0.50
Safe haven currency: CHF Bear 0.10 -39.5 -3.0 -0.54
Baltic Dry Index Bull 0.06 -21.6 -1.5 -0.33
Industrial metals Bull 0.25 214.2 7.3 0.41
Gold Bear -0.07 83.2 3.8 0.12
CBOE Volatility Index Bear -0.23 104.8 4.5 0.17
ETF flow Bear -0.11 55.7 2.8 0.03
January effect Bull 0.04 15.2 0.9 -0.34
Halloween effect Bull 0.10 107.8 4.6 0.21
Buy and hold 88.9 4.0 0.11
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Table 18: TAA strategy backtests, market: US, prediction horizon: quarter, time period:
2000-2019
Trade
signal
Correlation
with future
return
Cumulative
return (%)
Annualized
return (%)
Sharpe ratio
Dow theory Bull -0.06 -18.0 -1.0 -0.22
Momentum: 3m Bull 0.10 38.5 1.7 -0.05
Momentum: 12m Bull 0.02 81.0 3.2 0.05
Shiller PE Bear -0.12 -39.5 -2.6 -0.35
Dividend yield Bull 0.21 74.8 3.0 0.04
Value composite Bear -0.16 -19.3 -1.1 -0.27
Fed model Bull 0.03 34.5 1.6 -0.06
Payout ratio Bull -0.27 -67.8 -5.8 -0.67
Standardized unexpected earnings Bull -0.06 2.3 0.1 -0.19
GDP gap Bear 0.14 -23.9 -1.4 -0.30
Consumption to wealth ratio Bull -0.14 -47.4 -3.3 -0.49
Inflation target: 2% Bear -0.32 251.5 6.8 0.33
Yield curve: 10y-2y Bull 0.01 -52.3 -3.8 -0.52
Central bank balance sheet Bull -0.40 -61.1 -4.8 -0.59
Excess reserves Bull -0.13 -28.6 -1.8 -0.28
Monetary aggregate: M1 Bull -0.01 -24.6 -1.5 -0.33
Debt to GDP ratio Bear 0.01 -20.8 -1.2 -0.29
Shadow banking Bear -0.24 7.1 0.4 -0.18
Credit impulse Bear 0.11 -34.9 -2.2 -0.41
Credit spread Bear -0.15 128.1 4.4 0.16
Domestic currency Bear 0.00 -27.9 -1.7 -0.33
Safe haven currency: JPY Bear 0.09 -28.5 -1.7 -0.36
Safe haven currency: CHF Bear 0.09 -49.2 -3.5 -0.50
Baltic Dry Index Bull 0.28 78.0 3.1 0.05
Industrial metals Bull 0.20 24.0 1.1 -0.10
Gold Bear -0.01 -1.9 -0.1 -0.21
Bull-bear ratio Bear 0.05 0.9 0.0 -0.22
CBOE Volatility Index Bear 0.01 -27.3 -1.7 -0.30
Put-call ratio Bull 0.18 -1.2 -0.1 -0.24
ETF flow Bear -0.31 74.4 3.0 0.05
January effect Bull 0.03 27.4 1.3 -0.17
Halloween effect Bull 0.09 115.8 4.1 0.13
Buy and hold 100.5 3.7 0.08
Table 19: TAA strategy backtests, market: Europe, prediction horizon: quarter, time
period: 2003-2019
Trade
signal
Correlation
with future
return
Cumulative
return (%)
Annualized
return (%)
Sharpe ratio
Momentum: 3m Bull 0.15 87.9 4.0 0.12
Momentum: 12m Bull -0.02 51.3 2.6 0.02
Dividend yield Bull -0.07 -32.7 -2.4 -0.39
Value composite Bear 0.03 -40.8 -3.2 -0.45
Payout ratio Bull -0.06 -28.6 -2.1 -0.36
GDP gap Bear -0.25 78.2 3.7 0.15
Inflation target: 2% Bear -0.12 166.6 6.3 0.32
Yield curve: 10y-2y Bull 0.23 -6.6 -0.4 -0.30
Central bank balance sheet Bull -0.36 -63.3 -6.1 -0.74
Excess reserves Bull -0.15 -38.8 -3.0 -0.38
Monetary aggregate: M1 Bull 0.43 197.5 7.0 0.32
Shadow banking Bear 0.43 -63.2 -6.1 -0.83
Credit impulse Bear -0.28 116.8 5.0 0.18
Credit spread Bear 0.26 -7.5 -0.5 -0.37
Domestic currency Bear 0.05 72.3 3.5 0.09
Safe haven currency: JPY Bear 0.15 -40.8 -3.2 -0.45
Safe haven currency: CHF Bear 0.25 -54.9 -4.9 -0.60
Baltic Dry Index Bull 0.37 117.1 5.0 0.19
Industrial metals Bull 0.29 137.7 5.6 0.21
Gold Bear 0.01 -43.5 -3.5 -0.54
CBOE Volatility Index Bear -0.03 -50.3 -4.3 -0.49
ETF flow Bear -0.24 83.4 3.9 0.11
January effect Bull 0.07 37.8 2.0 -0.05
Halloween effect Bull 0.00 55.2 2.8 0.03
Buy and hold 85.0 3.9 0.10
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Figure 4: Regression diagnostics: Central bank balance sheet, US
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Figure 5: Regression diagnostics: Inflation target: 2%, US
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Figure 6: Regression diagnostics: ETF flow, US
